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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides insight into the implementation of the most recent land law reform in 
Tigray, Ethiopia. I use a two round panel of data from 2006 when the law was passed and 
2010, four years after enactment, to explore the knowledge and perceptions of the new law, 
and to study the impact the legal knowledge (as a proxy for the value of the policy) on 
conservation investments. Results reveal mixed perceptions of the law and an increase in 
legal knowledge between 2006 and 2010 although this is more attributed to time rather than 
to direct dissemination by the land administration committees. Econometric regressions using 
Instrumental variable regression and control function methods to control for endogeneity of 
knowledge and unobserved heterogeneity provide evidence of significant positive effects of 
the law on conservation investments. 
 
 
Key words: Land law, legal knowledge, conservation investment, land administration 
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1.0 Introduction 
In developing countries, majority of the population resides in rural areas and derives its 
livelihood from harnessing natural resources including land and water to produce agricultural 
output. According to the population reference bureau (PRB), 66% of residents in less developed 
countries resided in rural areas by 2008 (United Nations 2008). Although overwhelmingly 
dependent on farming, rural livelihoods as well as developing country economies are currently 
threatened by agricultural productivity decline arising from land degradation (Holden & Shiferaw 
2000).    
       
Despite the fact that technical disciplines such as soil science are vital for finding solutions, land 
degradation is not a purely technical affair. It is also an economic issue that requires economic 
answers. Specifically in the developing world, information and markets are imperfect, transaction 
costs are high and property rights insecure (Rodrick 1988). Compounded by high discount rates, 
these conditions perpetuate an externality condition where the private costs of degradation 
diverge from its social costs leading to suboptimal exploitation of land. In addition, high 
population pressure, poverty, land tenure insecurity, limited market development and insufficient 
market integration, limited institutional development, farmers‟ attitudes and institutional and 
policy failure further complicate the problem (Fitsum et al. 2002)  
 
Against this background, the role of appropriate economic policy as a precursor for sustainable 
land management and ultimately sustainable economic development is not questionable. Rather, 
the dilemma faced by policy makers is the choice and effective implementation of appropriate 
policy. In fact misaligned policy might influence production decisions in such a way that 
suboptimal land management practices are encouraged which exacerbates rather than alleviate the 
degradation problem (Barbier 1997). 
 
After the classical work of  Coase (1960), Demsetz (1964) and Pigou (1920),  a large body of 
economic literature has advocated for price/incentive-based policy over regulatory/command and 
control policy for internalizing externalities such as land degradation. The economic rationale for 
this is the cost-effectiveness of incentive-based policy.  
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However in practice, other than cost-effectiveness, policy makers may have several other criteria 
including overall effectiveness, political feasibility, monitoring and enforcement capability, 
information requirements, ease of implementation and clarity to the general public on which to 
judge appropriate policy (Hahn & Stavins 1992). 
 
It is thus not surprising to find that governments in developing countries have disproportionately 
relied on regulatory rather than the incentive based approach to correct for externalities that lead 
to land degradation. In recent years, the governments have established legal and institutional 
structures to create a policy environment that enhances sustainable land management and 
productivity (Deininger 2003). However in most cases, success of the regulatory approach has 
been limited and implementation of the legal provisions proceeded very slowly as evidenced in 
Uganda and Tanzania (Deininger et al. 2004).  
 
Like many other developing countries, land degradation in Ethiopia is dire. In 2003, farmers‟ 
unsustainable land management practices were estimated to cost the economy about 3% of GDP 
in form of direct costs from soil and nutrient loss (Berry 2003).  In highlands such as Tigary, the 
problem is even more pronounced (Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003). Tigray‟s lack of sufficient 
rain and irrigation water in an environment that is largely semi-arid by nature worsens the 
situation (Fitsum et al. 2002) 
Starting with decentralization of the responsibility of land policy to regional governments in 
1997, the Ethiopian government has instituted several policy reforms and laws to curb land 
degradation and stimulate more sustainable agricultural and economic development.  
 
Against this background, the regional state of Tigray revised its land law recently in 2006. This 
legislation dubbed the Rural Land Administration and Utilization Proclamation No.97/2006 
provides for the establishment of Land Administration Committees (LACs) at both Kushet
1
 and 
Tabia
2
 levels. These are accountable to the Environmental Protection, Land Administration and 
Utilization Authority (EPLAUA) at the Woreda
3
 desk.  
                                                 
1
 Kushet is the lowest local administrative unit 
2
 Tabia is the village level administrative unit 
3
 Woreda is the highest local administrative unit in the region 
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However as highlighted earlier, the success of such regulatory approach has been limited in 
developing countries. Nevertheless, pervasive market failures would deem price-based 
approaches also highly precarious. Moreover, given the already binding resource constraints 
faced, effective implementation of regulatory approaches is even more questionable.  
 
Thus, the dilemma faced by policy makers and analysts is the choice of appropriate policy and 
thereafter its effective implementation in a way that achieves the intended results on ground. As 
such, it is important to identify factors that are conducive to more effective implementation of 
legal changes. Experiences from countries that have recently made legal changes such as Ethiopia 
could produce valuable lessons to others with similar conditions.  
 
In this paper I use experience from Tigray in Ethiopia to answer the following research questions. 
(i) What is the extent of knowledge of the law by households and LAC members? (ii) Has 
knowledge of the land law improved land management? and (iii) What are the perceptions of 
community on the land law?  
 
The overall objective of this research is to explore the perceptions and knowledge of the new land 
law by the households and LAC members and investigate whether legal knowledge has had an 
effect on sustainable land management in the region. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Evolution of Ethiopia’s Land Policies 
To provide a clearer understanding of the events surrounding the enactment of Tigray‟s most 
recent land law and its implication for sustainable land management, I highlight the evolution of 
land policy in Ethiopia and discuss the related challenges that have given rise to the different 
policy arrangements over the years. 
 
In 1975, a radical land reform by the then new military government (1974-1991) known as the 
„derg regime‟ became the major turning point for Ethiopia‟s land policy and is still its axis today. 
This reform transferred all rural land to the state for redistribution of use rights to the farmers for 
free.  
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Prior to this, the tenure system varied in the different regions with a customary system in the 
northern parts like Tigray and private ownership with widespread absentee landlordism in the 
south (Adal 2001).  
 
This tenure system was characterized by high insecurity and underutilization of land in all 
regions but especially in the south which had mostly landlord–tenant arrangements. Insecurity 
was a result of threat of eviction, lengthy and costly disputes and absence of a fair legal process 
free form political interference. In addition, tenure security was undermined by the authorities‟ 
ability to redistribute land, which was sometimes used for political reasons (Ege 1997). 
 
Although it achieved a more egalitarian land distribution than in most African countries, the 
reform restricted cultivators‟ rights to only use and bequeath rights while transferability either 
through mortgage, sale or lease was prohibited. In addition, use rights to land were contingent on 
proof of permanent physical residence, thereby preventing migration. Maximum farm size per 
family was also restricted to 10 hectares and all factor markets including the labor market 
outlawed (Rahmato 1984).  
 
The derg regime was also characterized by collective agriculture in form of cooperative societies 
and expansion of collective farms. However unlike some countries like China, where 
collectivization of land was associated with high levels of investment in irrigation and other land-
improving infrastructure (Dong 1996), in Ethiopia, most of the land remained rain fed and 
suffering from degradation and soil erosion (Kebede 2002).  
 
The current government took power from the military government after a guerilla war in 1991 
and has since then instituted several land policy reforms. First, land certification started in Tigray 
in 1998 and has been viewed to be low-cost, more market friendly, pro-poor and also causing 
increased tenure security (Holden et al. 2009). Secondly, the 1997 federal rural land 
administration proclamation (FDRE 1997) following  article 52(2)(d) of the 1995 constitution 
delegated rural land and natural resources administration to regional governments.  
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It also empowered them to enact and promulgate laws governing land and resource utilization in 
their regions. Third, land rental markets were opened although duration of contracts and amount 
of land that can be rented/leased are still restricted. 
 
However apart from these changes, most land policies are still seen to reflect those of the past 
governments (Deininger, K et al. 2006b). Land is still fully owned by the state and is not subject 
to sale or mortgage but only to short term renting. 
 
Following the constitutional empowerment to regional governments, Tigray like the other regions 
of Oromiya, Amhara and SNNPR
4
 has passed land laws. These laws led to the land certification 
process mentioned earlier and saw an end to administrative land redistribution in the region. The 
most recent of these is the “Tigray Rural Land Administration and Utilization Proclamation 
(TRLAUP) No.97/2006” and is the focus of this paper.  
 
1.3 Overview of the TRLAUP No.97/2006 
1.3.1 Land administration 
The new legislation provides for the establishment of a land administration committee (LAC) at 
both Kushet and Tabia levels which reports to an environmental protection, land administration 
and utilization authority (EPLAUA) at the Woreda level. The law also provides for female and 
youth representation by allowing for at least two female representatives and one youth 
representative on each committee.  
 
Apart from their responsibility to improve local rural implementation of the land law, the 
committees also enhance rural land administration and resource utilization for sustainable 
management. They are also involved in settling land disputes, conducting land registration, 
sensitizing people about administration and the use of rural land, effecting land redistributions, 
recording of land rental contracts, ensuring that land interests of vulnerable groups such as 
women and landless young adults are taken care of, and penalizing people in case of land 
mismanagement.  
                                                 
4
 SNNPR is an abbreviation for „Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples‟ Region‟ 
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The new law restricts amount of land rented to 50% of own farm size and for not more than 2 
years to partners using traditional technology and up to 20 years to those using modern 
agricultural technology. Rental contracts between farmers should be ratified and registered by the 
Tabia land administration committee. Contracts between farmers and investors should be ratified 
and registered by the Woreda desk.  
 
To protect women‟s interests, the law insists that land that is commonly held by spouses can only 
be leased out after agreement by both.  
1.3.2 Land utilization 
The legislation outlaws a rural landholder from constructing a residential house in towns or other 
places except in the rural area at the place where he is allowed to establish. In addition, a rural 
land holder who leaves their Tabia for more than 2 years without sufficient ground would have 
their land redistributed to those who do not have land.  
 
To encourage sustainable use of land, farmers are obliged to conserve soil and water and to plant 
seedlings on both private and public land holding. Protection of trees on farm lands is the 
responsibility of the owner of the land on which the trees are grown. Plants that reduce the 
fertility of the soil such as eucalyptus and erosive crops are prohibited. The law also prohibits 
farm management practices that lead to destruction of trees on farmland and borders between 
farms. It also restricts farming on river banks to at least 3 meters away from river. Farmers have 
unlimited use and bequeath rights on their land, although land cannot be inherited by a person 
that is engaged in other activities than agriculture, who has his own land holding or who is an 
urban resident.  
 
The minimum farm holding is 0.25 hectares while the maximum is 2 hectares and land partition 
among heirs should not be made below the minimum farm holding.  
1.3.3 Penalties  
Conviction of violation of any of the provisions leading to damage of the land could lead to 
suspension of use rights or payment of a fine whose amount varies depending on the crime 
committed.  
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2.0 Literature review 
The role of assignment of property rights for the efficient utilization of resources begun with the 
classical work of Pigou. He showed that optimal levels of resource use could be attained by 
assigning of property rights to the polluter (Pigou 1920). On the other hand, (Coase 1960) 
demonstrated that under competitive markets with zero transaction costs, rights could be assigned 
to either the polluter or the sufferer. The resulting transactions would eventually equalize the 
private and social cost of pollution leading to optimal resource use.  
 
Empirical literature also shows that formalizing property rights is central to economic 
development (Maskus 2000). Against this background, policy makers in many developing 
countries have recently revised their land regulations and established institutions in a bid to 
provide more secure rights to land (Deininger 2003). 
 
However empirical evidence of the impact of tenure security on efficient land management 
especially in Africa is mixed. On one hand, some studies in rural Ethiopia show that tenure 
security has significant positive effects on land-related investments in soil conservation 
(Deininger, K et al. 2006b; Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003). On the other hand, other studies in 
the same country do not find any significant effects of tenure security soil conservation (Hagos & 
Holden 2006). Similar studies in other parts of Africa also found little impact of such security on 
either credit access or investment (Migot-Adholla et al. 1994). 
 
Although a large body of literature exists on the impacts of property rights on land investments 
(Barbier 1997; Deininger, K et al. 2006b; Deininger et al. 2008b; Gebremedhin & Swinton 2003; 
Hagos & Holden 2006), very few studies examine the impact of knowledge of the law on such 
investments. Tenure security and extent of legal implementation depends on people‟s awareness 
of their rights and their ability to enforce them. (Berkowitz et al. 2003) assert that legal reform 
strategy should choose legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is 
appreciated by domestic law makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final 
consumers of these rules. They argue that this is a crucial condition for improving the overall 
effectiveness of legal institutions, which over time will foster economic development. 
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Despite the fact that implementation of the land legislations and policies has been ineffective in 
most in most developing countries (Deininger 2003), and that legal knowlegde is of relevance to 
successful implementation of legal change, little attention has been paid to it in economic 
literature. A few studies like Deininger (2006a) found that knowledge of the land law increased 
land related investments, productivity and land values in Uganda. In China, dissemination of the 
new land law-hence increased legal knowledge, led to rapid implementation of the law an 
achievement rarely found in other developing countries (Deininger, K  et al. 2006).  
 
Failure to account for the knowledge variable may cause biased results and could explain the 
variance of results on the impacts of tenure security on land investments found in literature. 
Therefore in this study I intend to add to the existing body of literature first by accounting for 
legal knowledge and secondly by exploring the perceptions (people‟s demand for the new land 
law) and knowledge (people‟s awareness on the new law).  
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The new law presents a set of rights and restrictions on the usage of rural land which I 
hypothesize to have an influence on the investment decisions taken by the households.  
 
The theoretical framework builds on the canonical Agricultural Household model (Bardhan & 
Udry 1999) as the foundation together with the model developed by Gebremedhin and Swinton 
(2003) to explain the conditions for optimal soil conservation investment under perfect market 
conditions. By including knowledge of the law, I extend these models, to capture the various 
factors that influence soil conservation investment, and to explain the role played by the law on 
such investments. The theoretical framework is as follows: 
 
Farmers aim to maximize their utility from land use which is increasing in the present value of 
the future income stream from the land, household characteristics and asset wealth. Maximizing 
their utility however is subject to the constraints they face.  
 
First, households are faced with a budget constraint which is a function of the expected crop 
revenues (output) on the farm and the discounted value of the cost of investments including the 
investment in conservation.  
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The expected crop revenues are a product of the price of the product, the area planted, the yield 
and a binary expectation that the land will be kept in the next period which is in turn influenced 
by the provisions of the law. As such, restrictions or penalties like land expropriation in case of 
mismanagement (such as in the Tigray law) might create tenure insecurity by reducing the 
expectation of keeping land in the future which might reduce land investments. On the other 
hand, provisions that strengthen the rights of land holders will enhance tenure security.  
 
The cost of investment is a function of household characteristics, asset wealth and also the 
provisions of the law. A policy that increases transaction costs in the land rental or sale market in 
terms of search, negotiations, monitoring and enforcement of contracts may have a negative 
effect on land investments by reducing allocative efficiency from less productive to more 
productive farmers. On the other hand a policy that reduces transaction costs will boost 
investment on land. 
 
While maximizing utility, farmers are also constrained by the crop yield which is function of soil 
depth and other factors such as the resource constraints, soil fertility, weather, pests and diseases. 
Finally, the utility maximization problem is constrained by soil depth which decreases concavely 
with erosion. The erosion function is increasing in factors that govern the propensity to erode 
such as the slope, vegetation cover and other plot and soil characteristics while it is decreasing in 
both private and public soil conservation investments on land. 
 
In the theoretical framework explained above, I assume imperfect factor market conditions 
because in Tigray region factor markets are likely to be thin, missing or imperfect as is the case in 
most developing countries. Under these imperfect markets, the separation property in the 
agricultural household model breaks down such that the production and investment decisions 
depend on the preferences and endowments of households (Bardhan & Udry 1999; De Janvry et 
al. 1991). 
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2.2 Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework above, leads to the following hypotheses which will be tested 
empirically. Given that the effects of the law could have impacts in two different directions 
depending on the factors at play, the first two are opposing hypotheses. 
 
H1: Higher knowledge of the law by households increases investment in soil conservation 
structures. If the new law reduces tenure insecurity, then I expect that better legal awareness will 
boost investment in conservation. 
 
H2: Higher knowledge of the law by households decreases investment in soil conservation 
structures. If the new law raises tenure insecurity or transaction costs, then I expect that better 
legal awareness reduce investment in conservation. 
 
H3: Resource rich households are more likely to invest in soil conservation investments than 
resource poor households. Under imperfect market conditions, I expect households that are better 
endowed in labor and livestock assets to invest in conservation more than households that are 
less well endowed.  
 
2.3 Econometric model specification  
Following empirical literature by Clay (1998), Deininger (2006a), Gebremedhin & Swinton 
(2003) and Hagos & Holden (2006) as well as the theoretical framework above, the model for 
estimating the land conservation investment structural model can be specified as:  
 
0 3 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9hpt ht ht htp htp t ht t htp ht ht htI K X P T V W S L                         
 
hptI  denotes the conservation investment of household h on plot p in period t. Because most of 
the new conservation investments are made by public initiatives in Tigray, using these as an 
indicator for household conservation investment would be misleading. As such, htpI is measured 
by investment in the maintenance of soil structures which is the sole responsibility of individual 
households. 
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htX is a vector of household characteristics and includes sex, age and level of education of the 
household head at time t. 
 
htpP is a vector of plot level characteristics for household h in time period t. These variables 
capture the physical incentives to invest and include factors such as plot slope, size, distance from 
homestead, degree of farm fragmentation, and annual rainfall. With higher rainfall and steeper 
slopes, plots are more susceptible to erosion and this may increase the incentive to invest in 
conservation. Smaller, distant and more fragmented plots may reduce investment incentives. 
  
htpT is a dummy variable for tenure security captured by whether a given plot is on the certificate 
or not. These tenure security factors are used as a proxy for riskiness of investment. I expect land 
users to invest more on plots that are on the certificate because they are less risky.  
 
tV is a vector of market access factors in each time period. Higher returns to agricultural and non-
agricultural activities will lead to more land conservation investments. Market access factors 
therefore capture the financial incentives to invest in land and include variables such as distance 
to markets, distance from main road and access to credit. 
 
htW denotes household wealth and includes asset endowments like farm size, labor endowments 
and livestock holdings, in each time period. I expect farmers with more cash sources, asset 
holding, and human capital to invest more in land because they have better financial capacity to 
do so. 
 
tS is a vector of socio-institutional factors affecting investment in each time period for household 
h on plot p. These include public conservation investments via food for work programs, 
collective investments on private land and public conservation investments via mandatory 
community labor. I expect such institutional arrangements to positively influence investment on 
land. 
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htL is an index of legal knowledge of the members of the LAC in the tabia (village). Higher legal 
knowledge by the LAC members is expected to positively impact on conservation investments 
because there will be better enforcement of the new law. 
t is a time trend variable which is included to allow for aggregate time effects. 
ht  is the idiosyncratic error component for the structural model  
ht is the household unobserved heterogeneity arising from unobserved factors that influence 
maintenance of soil conservation structures at household level such as the farmer‟s social 
connections or  motivation / ability to conserve. The unobserved factors could also be at village 
level such as level of commitment of LAC to enforce sustainable land management in their tabia. 
0  and 1 9i    are the parameters to be estimated 
 
K  is an endogenous knowledge variable and is to be predicted from the equation below: 
 
1 2 3 4 5ht ht t ht ht t htK X V W Z               
 
htK  is measured by a knowledge index derived from the households‟ score on questions about 
the new land law. It is an endogenous corner response explanatory variable which is roughly 
continuous for strictly positive values i.e  0, 0 0ht htK P K    
 
htZ are the instruments included in the reduced form model and excluded from the structural 
model to correct for the potential endogeneity caused by correlation between the endogenous 
knowledge variable and the error term in the structural model. The instruments used were age of 
the household head and whether or not members of the household attended meetings prior to the 
registration exercise. 
 
ht  is the idiosyncratic error component for the reduced form model and it is uncorrelated with 
all explanatory variables and instruments included in the model. Correlation between the error 
terms ht and ht causes endogeneity of the knowledge variable. 
  and 1 5i   are parameters in the reduced form model 
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2.4 Estimation strategy 
Using a two round panel data set, I combine panel data methods with instrumental variable 
regression (IV) to consistently estimate the parameters in the investment model. My methodology 
proceeded as follows: 
If household knowledge of the new law is indeed endogenous in the investment model, then 
estimation using pooled OLS would produce biased estimates (Wooldridge 2002).  
 
Given the simplified structural model: 
'I x K                                                                                                            (1) 
where I denotes the conservation investment of household h on plot p in period t, 'x represents a 
vector of exogenous regressors at household or plot level, K is the suspected endogenous 
knowledge variable,  is the unobserved heterogeneity and  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
(Subscripts have been dropped for notational simplicity)  
'( , ) 0Cov x                                                                                                                  (2) 
( , ) 0Cov K   causes bias of the OLS estimates                                                          (3) 
 
The Hausman-Wu test on the data confirmed the endogeneity of knowledge variable and so 
pooled OLS was abandoned warranting the use of alternative approaches such as IV or the 
control function approach to control for endogeneity. 
  
Random effects estimation was used to control for unobserved heterogeneity
5
. Consequently, the 
Two Stage Generalized Least Squares (2SGLS)
6
 estimator that combines IV and RE estimation 
was adopted and used to consistently estimate the parameters of interest.  
 
The regular IV procedure would involve using the predicted values of the knowledge variable as 
a regressor in the second stage. While this regular 2SLS estimation is also consistent, in this case 
I used the predicted value from the first stage as an instrument (using the IV routine in stata) 
instead of using it as a regressor in the second stage as is done in the regular IV estimation.  
                                                 
5
 Fixed effects models were not feasible due to the incidental parameters problem and presence of time invariant 
regressors.  Reasons are explained in more detail later in the text 
6
 Pooled two stage least squares (P2SLS) models were also estimated to check the stability of results across several 
model assumptions. Results were similar to the 2SGLS model results and are reported in Appendix table.1  
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This alternative procedure is more efficient than the regular IV estimation and is fully robust to 
misspecification of the tobit model that was used in the first stage (Wooldridge 2007).  
2.5 Robustness Checks  
To check the robustness of the results, the control function approach was used with the residuals 
from a tobit model in the first stage used to control for endogeneity of knowledge in the structural 
model. Boot strapped standard errors were used to correct the standard errors from the first stage.  
For an endogenous corner response variable K , the control function approach proceeds as follows 
(Wooldridge 2007):  
Recalling the simplified model in (1) above, 
'I x K u                                                                                                    (4) 
'K Z                                                       (5) 
0K              (6)                                                                                                                                                                    
'( , ) 0E Z               (7)    
( , ) 0E K u                                                                                                         (8)   
 
where  represents the unobserved household factors influencing investment in conservation that 
may be fixed over time or time varying, u is an alternative error term that may arise from 
measurement error or omitted variables, 'Z is a vector of instruments and all other exogenous 
variable and other letters are defined as in (1) above.  
 
Endogeneity of K arises if u   is correlated with  .  
If ( , )u  is independent of 'Z , ( | )E u   and  is normally distributed (0, 1), then 
' ' '( | , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )E u Z K K Z K Z                                                                        (9) 
where  (.) = (.) / (.)   is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). This leads to the heckman two-step 
estimate for endogeneity. 
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This enables us to obtain the tobit estimator 

and to add the “generalized residual” 
' '( ) (1 ) ( )i i i igr K Z K Z   
  
    as a regressor together with the endogenous corner response 
variable K and the rest of the exogenous variables. 
 
Hence, the control function involved estimating  
' ' '( | , ) ( | , )E I x K x K E u Z K                                                                             (10) 
 
Consistency of the control function depends on the correct specification of the tobit model 
'( | )D K Z and linearity of conditional expectation ( | )E u  . This means in the case of a discrete 
endogenous variable such as the knowledge in this case, while the control function might be more 
efficient, it is less robust than standard IV approaches since imposes extra strict assumptions 
(Wooldridge 2007).  
 
Since model misspecifications may cause inconsistency of estimates from the CF approach, I felt 
less confident to rely on this approach as the main model of analysis and rather relied on the 
estimates from the 2SGLS described earlier as the basis of analysis while the estimates from the 
CF approach fitted better as a robustness check. Results from CF estimation are reported in 
Appendix table 2. 
 
Finally, note that the control function leaves an error due to the household heterogeneity ( ).  
To deal with this unobserved heterogeneity, either random effects (RE) or fixed (FE) effects 
models can be appropriate (Wooldridge 2009). However given the non- linearity of the 
investment model, the fixed effects model could not be used because its produces biased 
estimates (incidental parameter problem) when the time series dimension (t) is small compared to 
the cross-sectional dimension (n) as in this case.  
Note: The conservation investment variable took an ordered nature i.e (0 = Not maintained, 1 = 
Partially maintained, 2 = Well maintained, 3 = Improved). 
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In addition, household fixed effects were also infeasible because some dependent variables 
including one of the instruments (whether the household members attended meetings prior to the 
land registration exercise) was time-invariant and as such was bound to be eliminated from FE 
estimation. On the other hand, the RE estimation seemed more attractive since it allowed for the 
time-variant instrument and does not suffer from the incidental parameters problem in non-linear 
models.  
 
Nonetheless, it has the limitation of imposing an extra assumption that the unobserved effect in 
the outcome model is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009). Therefore 
pooled ordered probit models were estimated in the second stage. To test the stability of the 
results under different model assumptions, household random effects models were also estimated 
and the results were similar to those of the pooled estimation.  
 
Another issue of concern in this model (estimation) was the non-linearity of both outcome and 
reduced form models due to the ordered nature of the investment variable and the corner response 
nature of the endogenous knowledge variable (censored at zero). In such instances, some 
econometric textbooks have argued that the use of linear estimation such as OLS and 2SLS are 
inappropriate and non-linear models such as tobit or probit should be used instead (Greene 2000; 
Verbeek 2004).  
 
The challenge was that for the instrumental variable regression discussed earlier, there was no 
stata software (that I know of) that could estimate an IV ordered probit or logit model. 
Nevertheless, more recent research has shown that linear models are still appropriate even in the 
case of limited dependent variables (Angrist & Pischke 2009). For that reason, I used a linear 
2SLS regression for the instrumental variable regression.  
 
Finally, the instrument
7
 (the predicted value of knowledge from the first stage) was tested for its 
relevance. An F-test showed that the instrument strongly explained the variation in knowledge. 
                                                 
7
Regular IV procedure using the predicted values of the knowledge variable as a regressor in the second stage was 
also used to test the instruments (age and attendance of meetings prior to registration). The hausman test revealed 
that the knowledge variable was indeed endogenous, but the instruments were weak since the F-value was slightly 
below 10. The instruments also passed the Sargan‟s test of overidentification indicating that they were exogenous. 
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The validity test of overidentifying restrictions could not be tested because the model was exactly 
identified. 
3.0 Data and descriptive evidence 
Data in this survey were collected from June to August 2006 and between June and July 2010 
from the five main zones of Tigray region in northern part of Ethiopia. The data is part of a five 
round panel first collected in 1998. To capture the differences in knowledge and perceptions of 
the new law introduced in 2006, only data from 2006-when the law had just been introduced, and 
2010-four years later, are used in this analysis.  
 
Stratified sampling was used to select 16 communities based on distance to market, geographic 
location, irrigation projects and population density. From these communities, 25 households were 
randomly sampled. In 2010, one of the communities declined the survey leaving 15 of the 
original 16 communities.  
 
Data were collected for standard household characteristics as well as for plot level variables for 
each plot owned by the sample households. In addition questions on knowledge and perceptions 
of the new law were asked separately for male and female heads in the households as well as the 
members of the LAC.  
3.1 Results from the descriptive analysis 
Descriptive analysis is presented in tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 shows the perception of households 
on the level of activity of the LAC in their Kushet or Tabia. Table 2 shows the impact of the LAC 
on land management for only those households that reported to have been affected by the LAC in 
some way while Table 3 presents results for the LAC and households‟ knowledge of the new law. 
Results from all these three tables are discussed together to enable comparisons of results. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Continued from page 16 
Test of endogeneity: F(1,1407)     =  7.10686  (p = 0.0078) 
Test for instrument relevance: F(  2,  1407) =    8.30,  Prob > F =    0.0003 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: Chi2(1)   =  0.404801  (p = 0.5246) 
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Table 1: Household perceptions on activity of the LAC in the Kushet and Tabia  
Level of LAC activity Number of observations (%) 
 Active 480 81.7 
Not active 480 13.3 
Do not know 480 5.0 
Households affected by LAC  393 46.4    
 
 
 
Table 2: Effect of the LAC on land management for households that reported to have been affected  
by the LAC 
Impact of LAC Number of observations                          (%) 
Participation in information meetings 178 68.0 
Improved knowledge about land management 177 83.6 
Improved land management 177 80.8 
Land loss to the LAC 177 7.90 
Has become more tenure secure 178 83.2 
Reduced land renting activity due to fear of loss of land 177 18.1       
Reduced migration activity due to fear of loss of land 177 30.5 
Improved conservation of land due to fear of  losing the land  178 70.2 
Has started to report land renting/sharecropping to the  LAC/Tabia 179 52.0       
Household received a  warning or been penalized by the LAC  473 1.48       
Satisfied with the LAC performance 474 69.4        
*Responses were only from heads of households 
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Table 3: Knowledge of the land law by households and LAC members    
Year  2010   2006 
Knowledge of the land law (% of respondents who answered correctly) Men Women LAC Men Women 
Familiarity with the new land proclamation and its content (% familiar)  53.8 (297)  38.3 (144) 54.3 (132)   
Does the new land proclamation affects how your household manages its land? 
(% Yes) 
 49.2 (248)  28.6 (133) 48.9 (132)   
 
What is the maximum number of years households can rent out land to others who 
use traditional technology? 
 
 22.4 (268) 
 
11.3 (151)   
 
30.9 (123) 
  
 
Do the same restrictions apply to sharecropped out land as to rented out land?  
  
54.9 (304) 
 
48.8 (153) 
 
47.7 (123) 
  
What is the minimum farm size allowed?   11.8(304)  13.2 (152) 18.1 (127)   
What is the maximum farm size allowed?     2 (304) 1.3 (151) 0.81(124)   
What is the maximum farm holding to rent out? 47.3(298)  41.2 (153) 34.1(129)   
Can a spouse can deny another the right to rent out family land? 83.9 (304) 71 (155 ) 75 (128)   
Can an 18 year old son can deny parents to rent out family land if he wants to 
farm on the land?  
65 (303) 53.6 (155) 50 (130)   
 
Is it possible to expropriate land if household has been away for three years? 
 
33.2 (304) 
 
21.9 (155) 
  
63.5 (126) 
 
4.5 (223 ) 
 
4.6  (108 ) 
What is the maximum number of years households can rent out land to others who 
use modern technology? 
0  (267)      0  (151)   0.81 (123) 0  (221) 0  (106) 
 
In case of divorce, how is the land shared between spouses? 
 
89.7 (302) 
 
82.2 (152)     
 
87 (130) 
 
91.5 (212) 
 
91.1 (101)   
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Table 3 continued: Knowledge of the land law by households and LAC members 
Year  2010   2006 
Knowledge of the land law (% of respondents who answered correctly) Men Women LAC Men Women 
 
What is the minimum length for reporting land rental contracts? 
 
18.2 (303) 
 
9.03(155) 
 
7.7 (130) 
 
5.5 (218) 
 
5.6 (108) 
What happens to the use right if the head household has left the Tabia where the 
land is located for 10 years but the rest of the family stays on the land? 
62.5(304)     50.3(155)  30.8(130) 85.1(222)     85.2(108) 
 
Where should land disputes be settled? 
    
13.8(225) 
 
19.4(108) 
Is it possible to increase the rent after a contract has been made?    41.7(224) 36.1(108) 
Who has bequeath rights?     73.2(225) 58.9(107) 
What is the widow‟s share of land at the death of spouse?    78.0(224) 69.4(108) 
Is it legal to mortgage the right use of your land? 77.0 (304) 65.4 (155) 64.6 (132) 33.9 (224) 30.6 (108) 
Knowledge index (for all questions) 26.6 (304)     18.4 (155) 40.3 (132) 25.8 (224)   11.6 (108) 
Knowledge index (for questions asked in both years) 28.0 (304)     31.3 (155) 41.1 (132) 21.9(224) 10.4(108) 
* Figures in brackets are the number of observations           
*The sample is drawn from only those that reported to have some knowledge of the law. 
*Legal knowledge data on LAC members was not available in 2006 
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Table 3 shows that about half (54%) of the members of the LAC report to have some 
familiarity with the new law. Results also show that more men (54%) compared to women 
(38%) are familiar with the new land law. In addition only 49% of the LAC members, 49% of 
men and 29% of women report that the new proclamation affects the way their household 
manages their land. Table 1 shows that of the 82% of respondents that are aware that the LAC 
is active in their Tabia, 46% had been actually affected by the LAC. This preliminary 
descriptive evidence shows that both dissemination and implementation of the law both by 
the households and LAC are still low and this could have far reaching implications for 
investment and other land use decisions. 
 
This notwithstanding, for the households that have been affected by LAC, I find that most of 
these have been positively influenced. For example results from table 2 reveal that 84% of the 
households that had been affected by LAC had gained more knowledge about land 
management while 81% stated that it had improved their land management. In addition, 83% 
have become more tenure secure because of the LAC, 70% had improved conservation and 
68% had participated in information meetings. Furthermore, over 69% of households are 
satisfied with the performance of the LAC. This indicates that if properly facilitated, the LAC 
has a high potential to positively contribute to better land management for a larger number of 
the households.  
 
According to results from table 2, very few of all respondent households report to have lost 
land to the LAC or received any warning (2% and 8%) respectively  due to poor land 
management. Data available do not allow me to distinguish whether this is due to poor 
implementation of the law by the LAC or if indeed all households are managing their land 
well and as such cannot be penalized as provided for in the law.  
 
To explore the changes in knowledge between 2006 and 2010, I use some of the questions 
repeated in both surveys. Overall, I find that although the awareness levels are still low, there 
has been an increase in legal knowledge for both men and women. As reported in 3, a 
knowledge index computed based on the respondents‟ percentage of correct answers shows a 
general increase in knowledge from 10% to 31% for women and from 22% to 28% for men 
from 2006 to 2010. As expected, the LAC members have a higher knowledge index than both 
men and women of 41%.  
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This result may signal that LAC members have more exposure to the new legal provisions 
than the rest of the community members by virtue of their positions and the social capital that 
they possess.   
              
 Specifically, although only 31% of women and 34% of men were aware that it was illegal to 
mortgage the use right for their land in 2006, this figure more than doubled to 65% and 77% 
for women and men respectively in 2010 and was only 65% for the LAC members. 
Furthermore, although the level of awareness that all rental contracts should be reported is 
still very low there has been an increase from 6% to 18% for men and 6% to 9% for women 
between 2006 and 2010 and it was only 8% for the LAC members.  
 
Another set of legal questions about whether households are aware that land for households 
that have migrated for more than two years could be confiscated and distributed to others 
indicated that very few households are aware of this both in 2006 and 2010. However even 
with this question, the proportion of those who were aware increased from 5% and 5% to 
33% and 22% for men and women respectively and stands at 64% for the LAC members 
much higher than both men and women. These findings further justify the need to confirm 
whether this increase in knowledge actually led to improvement in investments by the 
households or not. 
 
One of the provisions allows households to rent out to others that use modern technology for 
a maximum of 20 years but none of the households answered this correctly both in 2006 and 
2010. Similarly only one member of the LAC was aware of it. The law does not clearly define 
what constitutes modern technology and this was not properly understood even by the LAC 
members and tabia leaders that we spoke to. It is therefore not surprising that this ambiguity 
is expressed by the fact that none of the households answered correctly on this and further 
illustrates that laws can only impact on the masses if they are properly understood.  
 
The question about responsibility for sustainable management of land aimed to find out 
whether households know that according to the law tenants are responsible for sustainable 
management of rented land. An impressive 72% of the LAC, 71% of men and 65% of women 
were aware of this.  
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As the data reveal that almost half (46%) of households participated in the rental market, 
knowledge of this provision could have far reaching implications for sustainable land 
management. Knowledge by landlords and LAC members could enable them to enforce the 
provision causing tenants to act in accordance with the law to avoid penalty for poor 
management of rented land.   
 
Table 4 shows the perceptions of the households and the LAC on the new law. Results reveal 
that households‟ perceptions are mixed with some provisions having very positive perception 
by a large number of households while others are negatively perceived. Majority of 
respondents (96% of the LAC, 78% of men and of 74% women) agree with the provision that 
all rental contracts should be written and reported to the tabia although as reported in table 2, 
only 52% of the households affected by the LAC had started doing so. Given the amount of 
support for this regulation, the low level of knowledge (6% on average) on this regulation 
may be one of the reasons why few households are reporting their contracts.  
 
The other provisions that are highly supported by households include (i) equal sharing of land 
upon divorce (99 % of LAC members, 98% for men, and 93% for women), (ii) land sales 
being illegal (98% for men, 91% for women and 86% for the LAC members), (iii) and land 
mortgaging being illegal (85% of men and 76% of women and 76% of LAC members).  
 
About 64% of men and 80% of women disagree that land should be confiscated from 
households after two years of migration. On the other hand only 22% of the LAC members 
disagree with this provision. Also, 57% of women and 46% of men while only 24 % of LAC 
members disagree that land should be taken from those who do not conserve their land well. 
46% of men, 53% of women and 28% of LAC disagree with the provision that only half of 
land holding should be rented out.  
 
Although these provisions are meant to discourage migration, avail land to households that 
most need it and enhance proper land conservation, these results show that the provisions may 
instead raise tenure insecurity. In an area that has had a long history of insecurity due to 
frequent land redistributions, this provision may ultimately have negative impacts on 
productivity and land management. These results further reveal that for these provisions, 
households have divergent views from the institution in charge of implementation-the LAC. 
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This situation may complicate implementation of the new law as it may cause the 
communities to resent the work of the committee even for all the other positive provisions.  
 
A related provision seeks to find out the people‟s perception on the provision that prohibits 
households from sharecropping or renting out all their land. The rationale of this provision is 
to ensure food security by ensuring that households keep a minimum land holding on which 
they can grow food for their families. About 78% of women, 68% of men and 41% of the 
LAC members disagree with the provision. An even large number of households (95% of 
LAC members, 95% of women and 94 % of men) disagree that even households that lack the 
capacity to plough their land such as the poor, female headed and disabled should be 
forbidden from share cropping out all their land.  
 
These results indicate that there is a perceived need in the communities for the necessity to 
transfer land to more productive users. Although there is an egalitarian distribution of the land 
resource, there is a more skewed distribution for other non-land factors of production mainly 
oxen and labor. This provision may therefore have a negative impact on the production 
efficiency in the area. 
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Table 4. Perceptions of the new land law (2010) 
Legal provision Respondents that agree with it (%) 
 
Men Women LAC 
All land rental contracts should be written and reported to the tabia 78.1 (247) 74.2 (147) 95.9 (125) 
Only half of the farm holding should be allowed rented out 54.4 (252) 47.4 (133) 72.8 (125) 
 Legal support for land conflict resolution related to land renting should only  
be provided if contracts have been reported and registered at the tabia  
 
58.2 (251) 47.0 (134) 66.4 (125) 
 Equal sharing of land upon divorce 97.6 (251) 93.3 (134) 99.2 (126) 
 Land sales should be illegal 97.6 (251) 91.0 (134) 86.4 (125) 
 Land mortgaging should be illegal 85.1 (249) 75.6 (131) 76.0 (121) 
Land should be taken from households that have been away for more than 2 
year even if they have no permanent job 
 
35.3 (249) 20.3 (133) 78.4 (125) 
Females should be allowed to plough the land 41.8 (249) 39.9 (133) 79.7 (123) 
Land should be taken from households that do not conserve their land well 54.2 (249) 33.8 (133) 76.6 (124) 
Households are not allowed to sharecrop out all their land 32.3 (297) 22.6 (147) 59.2 (124) 
Female-headed households, orphan households and other poor households 
should  not be allowed to sharecrop out all their land  
 
6.1 (294) 5.4 (148) 5.4 (124) 
Land should be taken from households that have been out of the village for 
more than 2 years  
 
21.0 (295) 10.9 (147) 77.5 (111) 
The landless should be given more of the land through redistribution 69.8 (285) 64.5 (138) 79.5 (127) 
There will be no new land redistributions in the tabia within the next ten years 48.8 (297) 41.0 (143) 46.3 (124) 
*Figures in brackets are the number of observations 
*Data from 2006 was not available for comparison with 2010. These questions were not included in the 2006  
survey 
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Key household and parcel characteristics are reported in tables 5 and 6 respectively. Plot level 
variables indicate that the number of plots that were not maintained at all decreased from 19% 
to 12% between 2006 and 2010. Also, the percentage of well maintained plots increased from 
25% to 29% indicating an increase in soil conservation activity in the region between 2006 
and 2010. Data also reveals that in the region, most farmers conserve their plots using soil 
terraces. Over 70% of all plots were conserved with stone terraces and about 20% with soil 
bunds in both 2006 and 2010.  The rest had grass strips, live hedge, tree planting or gully 
control.  Susceptibility of plots to erosion is low with about half of the plots having no 
erosion at all in both 2006 and 2010, and about 25% of the plots having low erosion. 
 
Table 5. Household characteristics 
Year 
  
2006 
 
2010 
 
Overall 
 
   
Mean s.d Mean s.d Mean s.d 
Age of household head 54.6 14.4 55.1 14.5 54.9 14.4 
Distance to the market in minutes 86.6 61.2 85.1 57.1 85.7 58.7 
Literate household head (%) 33.4 
 
28.9 
 
30.8 
 Male headed households (%) 69.9 
 
68.9 
 
69.3 
 Number of observations 353 
 
504 
 
855 
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Table 6: Plot level characteristics 
Variable                                                                                                     2006 2010 Overall 
Average number of plots per household 3.2 2.82 3 
Distance to plot in minutes 28.2 26 26.9 
Plot size (tsimdi) 1.1 1.3 1.2 
Presence of public investment on plot (%) 26.7 21.3 23.7 
Mean male labour per tsimdi 6.1 7.2 6.8 
Mean female labour per tsimdi 6.2 7.6 7 
Maintenance status (%)    
Improved 40.5 22.4 30.6 
Well maintained 24.8 28.8 27 
Partially maintained 15.5 36.4 27 
Not maintained 19.2 12.5 15.6 
conservation type (%)    
stone terraces 75.2 71.3 73.1 
soil bunds 18.3 27.3 23.1 
Other (grass strips, live hedge, treeplanting, gully control) 6.6 1.5 3.8 
Land quality (%)    
Poor       46.1 34.6 39.6 
Medium 36.0 43.3 40.1 
Good 18.0 22.1 20.3 
Slope (%)    
Meda 37.1 80.2 61.2 
Tedafat (foothill) 37.0 13.4 23.8 
Daget (midhill) 26.0 6.5 15.1 
Soiltype (%)    
Baekel 25.5 22.5 23.8 
Walka 27.2 28.6 28 
Hutsa 25.9 21.1 23.2 
Mekeyih 21.4 27.8 25 
Soil depth (%)    
Deep 16.4 27.8 22.8 
medium 28.3 26.1 27.1 
shallow 55.1 46.2 50.11 
Susceptibility to erosion (%)    
High 16.8 6.9 11.3 
Medium 11.4 11.9 11.7 
Low 25.6 26.7 26.2 
None 46.2 54.5 50.9 
Number of observations 1421 1815 3236 
*Tsimdi is a local area measurement. 1 tsimdi is equivalent to 0.25 ha 
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4.0 Econometric results 
Table 7 presents the first stage regression results for the determinants of knowledge of the 
law. The results show that the level of legal awareness by the Tabia LAC has not had any 
effect on the level of knowledge by the households. Given that one of the major functions of 
the committees is to improve local rural implementation of the land law, this is a fundamental 
finding. In order to implement the law, households must first of all be aware of their rights 
and as such it is of fundamental importance for the LAC to educate the masses about the new 
law.  
 
This finding is crucial because it seems to suggest that the committees have so far been 
largely unsuccessful in implementing this vital aspect of their duty since it is implausible that 
households can enforce their rights if they do not even know them in the first place. This 
revelation reinforces earlier results from the descriptive analysis which showed that the 
knowledge, dissemination and implementation of the law among the LAC is still very low. 
The fact that the LAC is not facilitated at all in the execution of their activities, may be one of 
the reasons why the LAC has not been able to transfer its knowledge to the households so far. 
  
By contrast, the large and significant positive coefficient on the 2010 year dummy indicates a 
strong trend effect on the level of awareness of the legal provisions. Households‟ level of 
awareness of the law has increased significantly between 2006 and 2010 which shows that 
most of the knowledge acquired by the households has been as a result of this time variable 
rather than the direct impact of the dissemination of the law by the LAC.  
 
Another result that the first stage regression reinforces from the descriptive analysis is the fact 
that female headed households are more likely to be aware of legal provisions than their male 
counterparts. The coefficient on the sex variable is large and significantly positive which 
could indicate that females may have been more tenure insecure and as such may have a 
higher motivation to learn the provisions of the new law.  The results also show that wealthier 
households are more likely to have a higher knowledge of the law.  
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Table 7: Determinants of legal knowledge for household head: Pooled tobit estimates 
Variable 
Pooled 
Tobit 
coefficients             Standard error 
 
Legal knowledge of the land administration committee 
 
-0.008 
 
(-0.040) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult female) 0.018 (-0.030) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult male) -0.053 (-0.037) 
Sex of household head (1= Female, 0 = Male) 2.810**  (-1.328) 
Distance from home to the market in minutes -0.008 (-0.009) 
Tropical livestock units 0.717**  (-0.224) 
Presence of public conservation investments on the plots 1.602 (-1.011) 
Education of household head (1 = Literate, 0 = Illiterate) -1.35 (-1.092) 
Dummy for year 2010 10.408*** (-0.954) 
Whether members of household attended meetings prior to 
registration exercise 
4.910*** (-1.385) 
Age of the household head 0.097**  (-0.036) 
Constant 22.450*** (-3.394) 
Sigma Constant 18.198*** (-0.355) 
Chi2 152.336***  
Number of observations 1510  
Absolute value of z statistics ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
 
Table 8 shows results from the second stage of the two stage generalized least squares 
regression to identify the impacts of knowledge of the new land law on the maintenance of 
conservations structures.  
 
The major research objective was to find out the impact of knowledge of the law on 
conservation investments. Results from the second stage regression point towards a 
significant positive effect providing empirical evidence for the hypothesis that higher legal 
knowledge will increase investments in conservation investments.  
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These results were stable even in the pooled 2SLS and control function approach although 
they disappear slightly after bootstrapping which may be due to the inconsistency caused by 
the control function in non linear models as discussed earlier in the methodology.  
 
This finding provides evidence that ceteris paribus, better knowledge of the law has enhanced 
sustainable land management in Tigray. It lends support to a similar result in Uganda where it 
was found that better knowledge of legal provisions not only improved the propensity to 
make land investments but also increased farm productivity and land value (Deininger, K et 
al. 2006a).  
 
The importance of legal knowledge for land conservation is resounded by the fact that the 
coefficient of the level of legal awareness by the LAC is positive and significant showing that 
legal knowledge by the LAC committee increases conservation. Although we saw earlier that 
the committees have been unable to increase legal knowledge of the households, this result 
suggests that they have used their knowledge to facilitate better land management probably 
by enforcing the law. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this coefficient is small indicating that 
the impact of legal awareness by the LAC on conservation structure maintenance is still small 
and as explained before, this impact would benefit from better facilitation of the LAC.  
 
Neoclassical theory suggests that under imperfect market conditions, households‟ 
productivity decisions are dependent on their endowments. The results support the hypothesis 
that better resource endowed households will invest more than resource poor households.  
They also confirm the existence of a labor market imperfection expressed by the fact that 
households with more male labor per unit of land are also more likely to invest in 
conservation showing that labor endowments of households determine households‟ 
investment in conservation. 
 
The finding that wealthier households are less likely to invest in the maintenance of their 
plots than less wealthy households is unexpected and counter-intuitive. This is because under 
imperfect credit market conditions such as in Tigray, I expect these imperfections to produce 
a significant positive coefficient for the wealth variable given that wealthier households are 
expected to have higher financial capacity to invest.  
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Nevertheless, the result may indicate that some provisions of the law may have caused tenure 
insecurity resulting in disincentive effects overtime for the more wealthy households.  
 
Presence of public investments on the plot is found to have a significant negative effect on 
maintenance of conservation structures. Although earlier studies in the region found that 
public investments had stimulated private investments on land (Gebremedhin & Swinton 
2003; Hagos & Holden 2006), the negative coefficient on public investments in this survey 
may indicate that widespread public conservation programs in Tigray might have led to a 
dependence tendency whereby households expect that soil conservation is the responsibility 
of public programs. This may therefore have created disincentive effects for improvement of 
soil conservation structures on plots that have public investments.  
 
Similarly, the coefficient on 2010 year dummy is significant and negative indicating that 
households have reduced their investment in soil conservation over time. This finding may 
also be an indicator to the tenure insecurity caused by the law or the dependence tendency 
described earlier. 
 
The amount of rainfall received, extent of land fragmentation and plot size all have negative 
impacts on investment in soil conservation. As such, plots located in higher rainfall areas 
(hence high erosion) as well as larger and more fragmented parcels reduce conservation 
investment incentives for the households. This disincentive effect may be as a result of the 
higher cost of investment in all these cases.  Larger and more fragmented plots require more 
time and labor requirements for maintenance while more frequent maintenance is required in 
case of places with high rainfall due to high erosion. Finally, as expected households are more 
likely to conserve good quality than medium and poor quality soils and less likely to conserve 
plots with shallow than deep soils. 
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Table 8: Impact of legal knowledge on soil conservation investments: Two Stage Generalized Least  
Squares estimates 
Variable 
coefficients 
robust 
standard 
error 
Household characteristics 
  Legal knowledge of the household head 0.041** (-0.018) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult female) -0.002 (-0.002) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult male) 0.003 (-0.003) 
Sex of household head (1= Female, 0 = Male) -0.152 (-0.103) 
Tropical livestock units -0.086*** (-0.019) 
Education of household head (0 = illiterate, 1 = literate) 0.109 (-0.08) 
Number of plots operated by household -0.035* (-0.019) 
Plot characteristics 
  Medium soil depth -0.163 (-0.108) 
Shallow soil depth -0.155* (-0.091) 
Soil type (Walka) 0.128 (-0.096) 
Soil type (Hutsa) -0.183** (-0.091) 
Soiltype (Mekeyih) 0.151* (-0.09) 
Slope Tedafat (foothill) 0.068 (-0.078) 
Slope Daget (midhill) 0.055 (-0.095) 
Medium soil quality 0.015 (-0.074) 
Good soil quality 0.228** (-0.096) 
Medium susceptibility to erosion 0.148 (-0.124) 
Low susceptibility to erosion -0.172 (-0.117) 
No susceptibility to erosion 0.077 (-0.111) 
Plot size in tsimdi -0.076** (-0.035) 
Distance from home to the plot in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) 
Market access factors 
  Distance from home to the market in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) 
Socio-institutional factors 
  Legal knowledge of the land administration committee 0.009** (-0.003) 
Presence of public conservation investments on the plot -0.306*** (-0.072) 
Tenure security factors 
  Whether the plot is on the certificate (1 = Yes, 0 = No) -0.066 (-0.079) 
Dummy for year 2010 -0.875*** (-0.222) 
Rainfall received in mm -0.001*** (0.000) 
Constant 1.283** (-0.523) 
chi2 120.839*** 
  Number of observations 1436 
 Absolute value of z statistics: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
Test of endogeneity: F(1,1407)= 5.730381  (p = 0.0168) 
Test for instrument relevance: F(  1,  1408) =   15.82, Prob > F =    0.0001 
The model is exactly identified 
  
 
 
 
 
33 
 
5 .0 Conclusion 
 
With the wave of land policy reforms that has swept several developing countries in recent 
years, lessons from countries that have had reforms could provide the much needed guidance 
for other countries with similar conditions to follow. At the core of this research, was the 
objective to document experience from Tigray region in Ethiopia on how its recent land 
policy was implemented and to show its impact on sustainable land management.  
 
Households‟ perceptions (demand) of the new law indicate that certain provisions are highly 
supported and could bring about positive impacts on sustainable land management and hence 
rural livelihoods while others may impact negatively by creating tenure insecurity.  
 
Like has been the case for the implementation of regulatory policy in most developing 
countries, even in Tigray the dissemination of the law has so far proceeded slowly and level 
of awareness is still low both among households and the land administration committees. The 
results also suggest that the land administration committees have largely been unable to teach 
their communities about the new law.  
 
There is discrepancy between the demand and supply sides of the law as evidenced by the 
positive perceptions about certain provisions while households‟ knowledge on them was very 
low. This means that poor dissemination of the law has cost the region some of the potential 
benefits of sustainable land management that could have been reaped if more aggressive 
means of dissemination had been undertaken.  
 
Despite the low level of households‟ awareness of their rights and limitations to rural land, 
the finding that higher legal knowledge (by both the households and the LACs) has improved 
investment in conservation provides resounding evidence that legal change if enforced has the 
potential to improve sustainable land management.  
 
The broader policy implication of these findings is that there is need for low cost initiatives to 
increase knowledge of the new law among the rural poor in Tigray. Members of the land 
administration committees in the villages should be trained on the law and facilitated to pass 
on the knowledge acquired to the rest of the populace. 
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 Appendix table 1: Impact of legal knowledge on soil conservation investments: Results from the Pooled  
 Two Stage Least Squares estimation    
Variable 
Coefficients 
robust 
standard 
error 
Household characteristics 
  Legal knowledge of the household head 0.041** (-0.017) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult female) -0.002 (-0.002) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult male) 0.003* (-0.002) 
Sex of household head (1= Female, 0 = Male) -0.152 (-0.099) 
Tropical livestock units -0.086*** (-0.02) 
Education of household head (1 = Literate, 0 = Illiterate) 0.109 (-0.078) 
Number of plots operated by household -0.035* (-0.019) 
Plot characteristics 
  Medium soil depth -0.163 (-0.109) 
Shallow soil depth -0.155 (-0.097) 
Soil type (Walka) 0.128 (-0.097) 
Soil type (Hutsa) -0.183** (-0.09) 
Soiltype (Mekeyih) 0.151* (-0.091) 
Slope Tedafat (foothill) 0.068 (-0.08) 
Slope Daget (midhill) 0.055 (-0.096) 
Medium soil quality 0.015 (-0.072) 
Good soil quality 0.228** (-0.098) 
Medium susceptibility to erosion 0.148 (-0.127) 
Low susceptibility to erosion -0.172 (-0.119) 
No susceptibility to erosion 0.077 (-0.112) 
Distance from home to the plot in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) 
Plot size in tsimdi -0.076** (-0.035) 
   Market access factors 
  Distance from home to the market in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) 
Socio-institutional factors 
  Presence of public conservation investments on the plot -0.306*** (-0.073) 
Legal knowledge of the land administration committee 0.009** (-0.003) 
Tenure security factors 
  Whether the plot is on the certificate (1 = Yes, 0 = No) -0.066 (-0.079) 
Village level factors 
  Rainfall received in mm -0.001*** (0.000) 
Dummy for year 2010 -0.875*** (-0.209) 
Constant 1.283** (-0.482) 
chi2 139.468*** 
  Number of observations 1436 
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Appendix table 2: Impact of legal knowledge on soil conservation investments: Control function estimation 
 for testing robustness of results: Pooled ordered probit estimates 
Variable  
Coefficients 
Standard 
error Coefficients 
bootstrapped 
standard 
error 
Household characteristics 
    Legal knowledge of household head 0.041** (-0.014) 0.041 (-0.027) 
Number of plots operated by household -0.026 (-0.016) -0.026 (-0.031) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult female) -0.002 (-0.002) -0.002 (-0.004) 
Labour per tsimidi (adult male) 0.004 (-0.002) 0.004 (-0.004) 
Sex of household head (1= Female, 0 = Male) -0.092 (-0.085) -0.092 (-0.140) 
Tropical livestock units -0.097*** (-0.018) -0.097**  (-0.039) 
Education of household head 
 (1 = Literate, 0 = Illiterate) 0.103 (-0.070) 0.103 (-0.136) 
Plot characteristics 
    Medium soil depth -0.079 (-0.092) -0.079 (-0.136) 
Shallow soil depth -0.135 (-0.083) -0.135 (-0.151) 
Soil type (Walka) 0.072 (-0.084) 0.072 (-0.112) 
Soil type (Hutsa) -0.225** (-0.082) -0.225**  (-0.103) 
Soiltype (Mekeyih) 0.143* (-0.082) 0.143 (-0.100) 
Slope Tedafat (foothill) 0.097 (-0.071) 0.097 (-0.086) 
Slope Daget (midhill) 0.081 (-0.087) 0.081 (-0.130) 
Medium soil quality -0.029 (-0.066) -0.029 (-0.085) 
Good soil quality 0.287** (-0.088) 0.287**  (-0.133) 
Medium susceptibility to erosion  0.153 (-0.113) 0.153 (-0.119) 
Low susceptibility to erosion -0.056 (-0.096) -0.056 (-0.106) 
No susceptibility to erosion 0.212** (-0.093) 0.212*   (-0.110) 
Distance from home to the plot in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) -0.001 (-0.001) 
Plot size in tsimdi -0.039 (-0.027) -0.039 (-0.033) 
Market access factors 
    Distance from home to the market in minutes -0.001 (-0.001) -0.001 (-0.001) 
Tenure security factors 
    Whether the plot is on the certificate (1 = Yes, 0 = No) -0.021 (-0.068) -0.021 (-0.107) 
Socio-institutional factors 
    Presence of public investments on plot  -0.413*** (-0.068) -0.413**  (-0.130) 
Legal knowledge of the LAC 0.010*** (-0.003) 0.010*   (-0.005) 
Dummy for year 2010 -0.875*** (-0.166) -0.875**  (-0.318) 
Rainfall received in mm -0.000** (0.000) -0.000**  (0.000) 
Residual -0.039** (-0.014) -0.039 (-0.027) 
cut off point 1 -0.403 (-0.517) -0.403 (-0.924) 
cut off point 2 0.53 (-0.517) 0.53 (-0.922) 
cut off point 3 1.247** (-0.517) 1.247 (-0.915) 
chi2 170.664*** 
 
99.787*** 
 p-value 0.044 
 
0.044 
  Number of observations 1436 
 
1436 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaires 
Plot Level Questionnaire 2010 Tigray Survey 
Household Name:   Interviewer: GPS Coordinates for home of household: Altitude (masl) 
 Household Id. No.: Date of Interview: 1.  
Kushet: Tabia: 2.  
Does the household have a land certificate?    1=Yes       0= No  If yes, Year (EC) of receiving the certificate:_________ 
Land certificate information (copy information from land certificate),     If no, why no certificate? 1=Did not collect it, 2=No land at that time, 3=Too small land, 4=Land 
was not registered, 5=Tabia did not give me, 6=Lost it, 7=Other, specify 
Registration number on certificate:___________ 
Full name (owner):______________________________Sex of owner: ______________ 
Is owner current head of household? Yes     No    If no, relationship between listed owner and hhhead: HHhead is………………………    
Family size when land was allocated:____________ The time when the last land allocation was made: ___________________       The number of plots allocated: 
___________ 
Plot 
No.  
The name of the 
place where the plot 
is located 
 
Distance 
(minutes) 
Soil depth 
of the plot 
(Deep=1, 
medium=2
, or 
shallow=3) 
Plot 
size   in 
Tsimdi 
Measured
plot size   
in Tsimdi 
 
The plot is Adjacent to….. 
 
GPS 
Coordi-
nates 
 
Alti-
tude 
(Elev
a-
tion) 
 
Origi
n of 
plots 
Who 
decide 
on plots 
Who 
work 
on 
plots 
 
 
1 
     E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
Origin of plots: 1. Husband/Husband‟s family, 2. Wife‟s family, 3. Government., 4. Tabia, 5. Other, specify…. 
Who decide on plots (make production and investment decisions): 1.Husband/male head, 2.Wife, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Son, 6.Other, specify:       
Who work on plots: 1.Husband/male head, 2. Whole family, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Wife, 6.Son, 7.Other, specify:       
Cross/check information with plot level data from our earlier survey rounds: 
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Continued.... 
 
 
 
 
Plot 
No.  
The name of the 
place where the plot 
is located 
 
Distance 
(minutes) 
Soil depth 
of the plot 
(Deep=1, 
medium=2
, or 
shallow=3) 
Plot 
size   in 
Tsimdi 
Measured
plot size   
in Tsimdi 
 
The plot is Adjacent to….. 
 
GPS 
Coordi-
nates 
 
Alti-
tude 
(Elev
a-
tion) 
 
Origi
n of 
plots 
Who 
decide 
on plots 
Who 
work 
on 
plots 
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
      E: ________________ N: _________________ 
W: ________________ S: _________________ 
     
 
 
Origin of plots: 1. Husband/Husband‟s family, 2. Wife‟s family, 3. Government., 4. Tabia, 5. Other, specify…. 
Who decide on plots (make production and investment decisions): 1.Husband/male head, 2.Wife, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Son, 6.Other, specify:       
Who work on plots: 1.Husband/male head, 2. Whole family, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Wife, 6.Son, 7.Other, specify:       
 
Cross/check information with plot level data from our earlier survey rounds: 
 
 
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Does the household have plots that are not listed on the certificate?    Yes = 1           No = 0 
If yes, list the plots 
 
Plot 
No.  
The name of the place 
where the plot is located 
 
Distance 
(minutes) 
Soil depth of 
the plot 
(Deep=1, 
medium=2, or 
shallow=3) 
Plot size   
in Tsimdi 
Measuredplot 
size   in 
Tsimdi 
 
GPS 
Coordi-nates 
 
Alti-
tude 
(Eleva-
tion) 
 
Origin 
of plots 
Who 
decide on 
plots 
Who 
work on 
plots 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
Origin of plots: 1. Husband/Husband‟s family, 2. Wife‟s family, 3. Government., 4. Tabia, 5. Other, specify…. 
Who decide on plots (make production and investment decisions): 1.Husband/male head, 2.Wife, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Son, 6.Other, specify:       
Who work on plots: 1.Husband/male head, 2. Whole family, 3.Joint husband/wife, 4.Female head, 5.Wife, 6.Son, 7.Other, specify:       
 
Cross/check information with plot level data from our earlier survey rounds: 
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Land rental and partners in rental market 
Have you rented in or out land during the last year?  Yes=1         No=0               If no, skip this page. 
NB! Keep plot number the same as in land certificate and the following list of plots 
 
      
Plot                                        
No. 
Plot Name 
Tenure 
status 
Rented-in plot Rented-out plot 
Reasons 
for 
renting 
out 
If the plot is transacted, details about rental partners 
2000 
1=yes 
0=no 
2001 
1=yes 
0=no 
2000 
1=yes 
0=no 
2001 
1=yes 
0=no 
Name Relati
onshi
p 
Kushet How long 
has the 
contract 
partnership 
lasted? 
Where 
rental 
partner 
lives 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
Tenure status: 1.Own land with certificate, 2.Own land without certificate, 3.Rented in, 4.Transferred, 5.Inherited, 6.Other,specify: 
Reasons for renting out: 1= lack of labour, 2= lack of oxen, 3= unable to rent oxen, 4=lack of cash, 5= credit obligation, 6=other, specify…,  
Relationship: 1=husband‟s close relative, 2=wife‟s close relative, 3=distant relative, 4=ex-husband/ex-wife, , 5= non-relative, 6=Son/Daughter, 7=other, specify, 
Where rental partner lives: 1= within the kushet, 2= within the tabia, 3= A closer tabia, 3= distant tabia, 4= other, specify.  
How long: How many years has the contract partnership lasted
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Land characteristics 
! Keep plot number the same as in land certificate and the following list of plots 
 
Plot 
No. 
Plot Name 
Irrigated? 
1=yes, 0=no 
Soil 
Type 
Soil 
Depth 
Slope 
 
Land 
quality 
Weed 
infestation 
Susceptibility to 
erosion 
Degree of 
soil erosion 
/degradation 
1          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Codes: a) Soil type: 1. Baekel, 2. Walka, 3. Hutsa, 4. Mekeyih, Soil depth: 1.Shallow, 2. Medium, 3. Deep,         
Slope: 1. Meda, 2. Tedafat (foothill), 3. Daget (midhill), 4. Gedel (steep hill)              
Land quality: 1. Poor, 2.  Medium, 3. Good,  Weed infestation: 1. High, 2. Medium, 3. Low 
Susceptability to erosion: 1. High, 2.  Medium, 3. Low, 4.  None 
Degree of degradation: 1. Highly degraded, 2. Degraded, 3. Moderately degraded, 4. No degradation 
 
 
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Number of Visits to Plot (May 2001 – May 2002) 
 
Plot No. 
Plot 
Name 
Land preparation Planting 
Manuring/ 
Weeding 
Inspecting/ 
      Total 
No. of 
visits 
No. of Sole 
visits 
Fertilization (scaring birds) 
Harvesting Threshing If landlord, 
monitoring 
visit 
No. Who No. Who No. Who No. Who No. Who No. Who No. Who No. Who 
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
                                      
  
No: Number of Visits 
Who: Persons visited the plot:  1= Husband, 2= Wife/female head, 3= Husband and wife, 4= Husband and Son,  
                                                   5= Others, specify __ 
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Land market participation 
Fill in if household has participated in the land rental market (including sharecropping in or out) during the last year. 
! Keep plot number the same as in land certificate and the following list of plots 
Household No.: Interviewer:    
HH name Data of Interview:    
Kushet: Woreda:    
Tabia: Zone: Who decides 
2006 
plot 
Plot 
Name 
Land rental markets Byproducts, who get them? Responsibilities   Contract Crop Share 
no Contract Type Duration 
If 
duration
>3 yrs, 
specify 
Pay
ment 
Advance 
payment 
Paid 
when 
Cost-sharing 
arrange-ment 
Crop 
residues Manure Grasing New SWC 
Maintain 
SWC 
Pay land 
tax type choice rate/Rent 
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
                                    
       
Contract: 1.  Fixed rent (cash), 2. Fixed rent (Kind), 3. Sharecropping (output only), 4. Cost sharing, 5. Output sharing after deduction of (cash) input costs,  
6.Other, specify:                                 Type: 1. Oral without witness, 2. Oral with witness, 3. Written and unreported. 4. Written and reported to tabia. 
Duration: 1. 1 year, 2- 2 years, 3. 3 years, 4. >3 years, specify……………., 5. Open ended. 
Payment: Fixed rent: cash amount, Sharecropping: Share of output to the landlord (Code: 1. 50%, 2. 33%, 3. 25%, other, specify:…………………… 
Advance payment: Cash amount in sharecropping contracts. 
Paid when: 1. Before cultivation, 2. After harvest, 3. Other, specify:………………….. 
Costsharing arrangement: 1. Landlord pays fertilizer and seed, 2. Landlord and tenant share cash input costs, 3. Other, specify:…………………………… 
Byproducts, who gets them/Responsibilities/Who decides: 1.Landlord, 2.Tenant, 3.Shared, 4.  Open 
Crop choice: 1. Landlord, 2. Tenant, 3. Follow follwing crop rotation system (specify): ……………….. 
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Land conservation and investment 
! Keep plot number the same as in land certificate and the following list of plots 
Plot 
no 
 
 
 
 
 
Plot name 
 
Conserve
d: 1. Yes,  
0. No 
If 
yes, 
When 
(year) 
Typ
e 
By 
whom 
Size 
Type of 
trees 
Maint
en-
ance 
of 
struct
ure 
Reasons for 
non-
maintenace 
or removal 
of structure 
Time use for 
investment, 
mandays 
Time use for 
maintenance
, mandays 
last year 
Have you 
considered 
planting trees on 
this plot? 
Why/Why not? 
Rank for 
Security 
Length Width 
   
 
           
  
            
   
 
           
  
            
   
 
           
  
            
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
Ranking of insecurity: 0. Very insecure, 1. Moderately insecure, 2. Moderately secure, 3. Very secure. 
*Conserved: (Mark with a “1” if occurred, “0” if not). 
d
 Types of conservation structures: 1= stone terraces, 2= soil bunds, 3= bench terraces, 4= grass strips, 5= gully control, 6= life hedge, 8= irrigation canal, 9= pond, 10= 
shallow well, 11= tree panting, 12=other, specify.  
a
 Size of investment:  Measurement should be appropriate for type of investment; e.g., length of stone terraces or bunds, number of trees planted, digging of wells or ponds 
c
 By whom: respondent household=1, landlord household=2, tenant household=3, mass mobilization =4, food for work=5, Cash for work=6, other, specify=7. 
d
Type of trees: 1= eucalyptus, 2= Other planted trees, 3. Natural trees 
Maintenance of structure: 1. Improved, 2. Well maintained, 3. Partially maintained, 4. Not maintained, 5. Partly removed, 6. Totally removed. 
Reasons for change in structure: 1. Pest problem, 2. Problem with ploughing, 3. High cost of maintenance, 4. Increase cultivated area, 5. Access fertile soil in structure, 6. 
Other, specify…..Considered tree planting? 1. No, prefer to grow food crops, 2. Illegal to plant trees on food crop land, 3. Plot is too far from home, 4. Land unsuitable for 
trees, 5. Other, specify……. 
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Tree planting and harvesting 
 
   2006 
     Plot no 
Stock of main trees on plot by age and number How many trees have you planted on the plot in 
the last…. 
Number  of trees harvested in the last  How has the 
number of tress 
changed in the 
last 5 years 
Eucalyptus Other trees Eucalyptus Other trees Eucalyptus Other trees  
0-3 
years 
3-8 
year
s 
>8 years 0-10 
year
s 
10-
20 
year
s 
>20 years Last 
year 
2-5 years 
ago 
Last 
year 
2-5 years ago Last year 2-5 years 
ago 
Last year 2-5 years ago 1 =increased 
2=constant 
3=decreased 
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
 
 
Household Name:   Household Id. No.: Interviewer: 
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Mekelle University 
 
In collaboration with 
 
 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB) 
 
 
NOMA DNRE Field Work 
 
Impact of Land Law Reforms in Tigray, Ethiopia,  
 
2010 
Land Administration Committee Member Questionnaire: 
 
Sample : To all LAC members in the Tabias and Kushets covered by the survey 
 
 
Zone ____________                            Code _______ 
 
Woreda __________                            Code _______ 
 
Tabia ____________                            Code ________ 
 
Kushet____________             Code________ 
 
Got______________             Code________ 
 
Name of LAC member______________________   
 
Member of type of LAC:      1= Tabia LAC  2= Kushet LAC  
 
Sex of LAC member:   1= Female   0= Male 
 
Is the LAC member Head of the household?    1=Yes      0=No 
 
Registration book number/Land certificate number_____________ 
 
Date of interview____________________ 
 
Enumerator  ____________________   Code ____  Signature ______________ 
 
Checked by:______________________________  Code____  Signature_______________ 
 
Accepted for data entry, date:________________ 
 
 
Date of data entry    _____________________ 
 
Data entry operator  ____________________   Code ____  Signature ______________ 
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Household Characteristics for household of LAC Member: 
1. Ask these to all LAC members  
S.no Questions Unit  Answer 
1 Year when became a member of the Land Administration Committee Year, EC  
2 Involved in land redistributions in the community? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
3   If yes, how many times? Number  
4   If yes, when were these distributions taking place?  Year(s)  
5 Age of mediator: Years  
6 Household size Number  
7 Number of male labor force in adult equivalents Number  
8 Number of female labor force in adult equivalents Number  
9 Ethnic group: 1=Tigray Code  
10 Religion: 1=Orthodox, 2=Islam, 3=Protestant, 4= Code  
11 Education of household head: Number of years of school completed Years  
12 Skills: 1=Carpenter, 2=Driver, 3=Farmer, 4=Manson,5=Drawer, 6=Merchant, 
7=Broker, 8=Engineer of rural land,10=Soldier,11=Weaver,12=Builder 
Code  
13 Position in community (other than LAC-member): 1=Ex-Chairman of the tabia,  
2=Ex-Secretary, 3=Priest/Religious leader, 4=Party member, 5=Ex-Social 
court  judge, 6=Conflict mediator, 7=Women’s group leader, 8=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
14 Off-farm employment: 0=No, 1=Seasonal agricultural labor, 2=Unskilled non-
agricultural labor, 3=Skilled employment, 4=Government job, 
5=Businessman, 6=Self-employed, 7=Other, specify: 
Code  
15 Marital status: 1=Married, 2=Polygamous, 3=Divorced, 4=Widow, 
5=Separated, 6=Single 
Code  
16 Number of children Number  
17 Age of children Ages  
18 Years of schooling of children  Years  
19 Health status of household: 1=Very good, 2=Good, 3=Poor, 4=Very poor Code  
20 Sickness in family last year? 1=Very severe sickness, 2=Severe sickness, 
3=Less severe sickness, 4=No sickness 
Code  
21 Death of family members last year? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
22 Asset holding of households: Number of houses Number  
23 House with corrugated iron roof: 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
24 Bicycle(s): 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
25 Other transportation equipment: 1=Yes, 0=No, if yes, specify: Code  
26 Ox plough: 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
27 Radio: 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 Mobile phone(s): 1=Yes, 0=No   
28 Number of oxen: Number  
29 Number of cows: Number  
30 Number of young cattle: Number  
31 Number of sheep Number  
32 Number of goats Number  
33 Number of donkeys/mules/horses (equines) Number  
34 Number of camels Number  
35 Other assets, specify: 1=   
36 Do you have a land certificate? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
37 Number of own plots of land? Plots  
38 Total Farm size (own land) Tsimdi  
39 Have there been changes in the amount of land this household controls during 
the period 2000-2010 (last 10 years)? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
40   If yes; Has the household lost or gained land? 1=Lost, 2=Gained Code  
41   If yes; What was the reason? 1=Redistribution, 2=Land dispute, 3=Inherited 
from husband’s family, 4=Inheritance from wife’s family, 5=Other reason  
Code  
42    If yes; When was this?  Year (EC)  
43 Number of plots on certificate Number  
44 Do you own any plots that are not on your certificate? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
45   If yes, number of own plots not on certificate Number  
46   If yes, why not on certificate? 1=Too small, 2=House plot, 3=Were rented 
out, 4=Were missed during registration, 5=Other, specify: 
Code  
47 Number of rented in (including sharecropped) plots Number  
48 Number of rented out (including sharecropped) plots:  Number  
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49 Rent-in plots: Plot size in tsimdi, total Tsimdi  
50 Rent-out plots: Plot size in tsimdi, total Tsimdi  
51 Did you have access to credit for purchase of farm inputs (fertilizer, seed) last 
year?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
52 Did you have access to credit for purchase of animals last year (long-term 
credit)? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
53 Do you participate in an edir group? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
54 Do you participate in an ekub group? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
55 Did you demand credit for farm inputs last year? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 Investment in perennials   
56 Fruit trees, type:1=Guava, 2= Number  
57 Eucalyptus trees >10 years old Number  
58 Eucalyptus trees 6-10 years old Number  
59 Eucalyptus trees 3-6 years old Number  
60 Eucalyptus trees less than 3 years old Number  
61 Other timber trees, type:1= Number  
62 Other perennials, by number, type: 1= Number  
63 Other perennials, by area, type: 1= Cactus, 2= M2  
 
2. Knowledge about the new land law (Proclamation) and regulation: Ask these to all LAC members 
S.N
o.  
Unit Answer
(s) 
1 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use modern technology? -=Don’t know 
# years  
2 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use traditional technology? -=Don’t know 
# years  
3 Do the same restrictions apply to sharecropped out land as to rented out land (fixed 
cash rent)? 1=Yes, 2=No restriction on length of contract for sharecropping, 3=Other, 
specify:  
 
Code  
4 In case of divorce, what happens to the land? : 1=Has to be negotiated between those 
involved; 2=Shared equally between husband and wife; 3=Other; 4=Don’t know. 
Numbe
r 
 
5 What is the minimum farm size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, -=Don’t know Tsimdi  
6 What is the maximum far size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, -=Don’t know ---  
7 How long-term must land rental contracts minimum be to have to be reported to the 
tabia and approved? 1=Three months, 2=One year, 3=Three years, 4=Ten years, 5=Do 
not have to report, 6=All have to be reported, 7=Don’t know,  
Years  
8 How large share of the farm holding can be rented out maximum? 1=One quarter, 
2=Half, 3=Three quarter, 4=Depends on family needs for food, 5=All,  
Code  
9 Who is responsible for sustainable management of rented land? 1=The certificate 
holder(landlord), 2=The tenant, 3=Joint responsibility, 4=Free to decide 
Code  
10 Is it legal for a household to mortgage the use right for its land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
11 The head of the household has left the tabia where the land is located for 10 years (but 
the rest of the family stays on the land). Does it affect the use right of the family?  
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
12 Can you deny your husband to rent out your family land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know, 
3=Other, specify:  
Code  
13 Does your 18 year old son have the right to deny you to rent out your land if he wants 
to farm on the land and is still living in your household? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know, 
3=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 A household has rented out all its land and has been away for 3 years but has no 
permanent  job, can the land be expropriated and distributed to other households in the 
community? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
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3. Activities of the LAC: Ask these only to the chairperson of the LAC 
S.N
o.  
Unit Answer
(s) 
1 How many training workshops have you been to as a LAC member since 2007 #  
 Total number of days spent on training Days  
 How many visits have you had to the Woreda desk of EPLAUA since 2007? #  
 How many times have staff from the Woreda desk of EPLAUA visited your 
tabia/Kushet since 2007 
#  
 Do you have a copy of the most recent land proclamation and regulation for Tigray? 
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=The committee has a copy but not me 
Code  
 Received other documents/training material from Woreda EPLAUA? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 If yes, specify types of documents/material: 
 
 
  
 How many meetings have you arranged in the tabia/kushet since 2007? #  
 What were the issues discussed in the meetings?  
 
 
 
  
 How many individuals participated on average?  Number  
 How many women participated on average? Number  
 How many women spoke up on average? Number  
 How much land has been allocated to landless households during the last 3 years? Hectares  
 How many young landless households have received land during the last 3 years in 
your tabia or kushet? 
#  
 How many landless households still remain in your tabia / kushet? #  
 How many households have been evicted from their land during the three last years 
due to migration? 
#  
 How much land has been confiscated due to migration? Hectares  
 How many cases have been taken to the woreda court due to this? #  
    
 Has Land rental contract registration been implemented in the tabia/kushet? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Partially. 
Code  
 If yes, who is responsible for the Contract Registry? 1=LAC at tabia level, 2=LAC in 
each kushet, 3=Tabia leader, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
 Are there many households that do not care about reporting their rental and 
sharecropping contracts? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Few only 
Code  
 What happens if someone is caught not reporting a contract? 1=They are given a 
warning and are asked to report it 
Code  
 Have all households with land in the village received land certificates? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 If no, how many households still lack land certificates? #  
 Has registration and demarcation of communal lands started in the tabia?   
 Has the LAC made a village Land Use Plan?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Partially, in the 
process 
Code  
 Has the LAC taken steps to enhance Sustainable Land Management? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Some steps, specify: 
 
 
Code (+)  
 
 
 
4. Perceptions and opinions on the land law (proclamation): Ask these to all LAC members 
S.no Question Unit Answer 
1 Are you familiar with the new land proclamation and regulation for your region and its 
content? 
1=Yes, 2=Some of it, 0=No 
Code  
 Do you agree with the following rules?   
2    Reporting of all land renting and sharecropping to tabia?  1=Yes, 0=No Code  
3    Only half of the farm holding should be allowed rented out?  1=Yes, 0=No Code  
4    Legal support for land conflict resolution related to land renting should only be 
provided if contracts have been reported and registered at the tabia level? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
5    Equal sharing of land upon divorce?   1=Yes, 0=No Code  
6    Land sales should be illegal?  1=Yes, 0=No Code  
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7    Land mortgaging should be illegal? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
8    Land should be taken from households that have been away for more than 2 year 
even if they have no permanent job, 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
9    Females should be allowed to plough the land?  1=Yes, 0=No Code  
10    Land should be taken from households that do not conserve their land well? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
  
11 Does the new land proclamation affect how your household manages its land?   1=Yes, 
0=No,  2=Don’t know 
Code  
12    If yes, explain how:  1=Take better care of it, 2=Ask tenants to take better care of it, 
3=Invest more on it, 4=Can take more responsibility for it, 5=Other, specify 
Code  
13    If no, why? 1=Follow traditional rules, 2=Managed the land well before also, 3=Do not 
know what is in the proclamation, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 How do you perceive a new regulation which states that the wife also should have her 
name and picture on the certificate?  1=Indifferent (acceptable), 2=Good, 3=Bad 
Code  
15 Would the wife’s name on the certificate, affect her power over the land? 
1=Has no effect, 2=She has a stronger position in case of divorce or husband’s death, 
3=She involves more in land-related decisions within marriage (e.g. crop choice and 
input use), 4=She controls more of the income from production on the land, 5=She is 
involved in land-renting decisions, 6=She does more work on the land, 7=Other, 
specify: 
Code 
Multiple 
responses 
possible 
 
16 Do you agree that all land rental contracts should be written and reported to the tabia?  
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Only contracts longer than 3 years 
Code  
17    If yes, why? 1=Good to have registration of such transactions, 2=Will make the land 
rental market work better, 3=Help avoid exploitative contracts, 4=Ensures that food 
needs of household is considered, 5=Strengthens bargaining power of landlords, 
6=Reduces land disputes, 7=Other, specify: 
Code 
Multiple 
responses 
possible 
 
18    If no, why? 1=Unnecessary and costly, 2=No benefit, 3=Inconvenient, 4=Increase 
tenure insecurity of poor people who fail to farm the land themselves, 5=Peole will not 
report anyway, contracts will go underground, 6=Other, specify: 
Code  
19 Do you perceive sharecropping as land renting and to be subject to the same 
regulations as land renting? 1=Yes, 0=No, sharecropping is not land renting 
Code  
20 Do you consider it legal for a household to sharecrop out all its land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Don’t know 
Code  
21 Do you think that households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
22 Do you think that female-headed households, orphan households and other poor 
households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land when they lack resources 
to cultivate it themselves? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
23 If yes, why? 1=It secures their livelihood, 2=They cannot use the land efficienctly 
themselves, 3=The land can be made available for more productive farmers, 4=Other, 
specify 
Code  
24 If no, why? 1=They should farm it themselves, 2=They should follow the law, 3=They 
should give away the land to others if they fail to farm it, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
25 Do you agree that farm holdings should not be further subdivided but be farmed jointly 
by family members? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
26 If yes, why? 1=Further fragmentation is bad for land use, 2=Cooperation is good for the 
families, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
27 If no, why? 1=Difficult to farm together, 2=Some are forced to leave, 3=It increases 
landlessness, 4=It is possible to subsist on smaller plots of land, 5=Other, specify: 
Code  
28 Do you think there will be any new land redistributions in your tabia within the next ten 
years? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
29 Do you think that the landless in the community should be given more of the land 
through redistribution? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
30 Do you agree that land should be taken from households that have been out of the 
village for more than 2 years but do not have a permanent job? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
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Mekelle University 
 
 
In collaboration with 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences 
 
 
Impact of Land Law Reforms inTigray, Ethiopia 
2010 
Perception Questionnaire 
Main Sample Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zone ____________                            Code _______ 
 
Woreda __________                            Code _______ 
 
Tabia ____________                            Code ________ 
 
Kushet____________             Code________ 
 
Got______________             Code________ 
 
Name of head of household______________________   
 
Household Number______________ 
 
Registration book number_____________ 
 
Date of interview____________________ 
 
Enumerator  ____________________   Code ____  Signature ______________ 
 
Checked by:______________________________  Code____  Signature_______________ 
 
Accepted for data entry, date:________________ 
 
 
Date of data entry    _____________________ 
 
Data entry operator  ____________________   Code ____  Signature ______________ 
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Household Land Issues: Land reform, knowledge, perceptions, preferences and 
women 
Questions to head of household: 
1. Changes in landholdings  
S.no Questions Unit  Answer 
1 How long has the household head been head of the household? Since.. Year(EC)   
2 Have there been changes in the amount of land this household controls during 
the period 2006-2010 (EC1998-2002)? 
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know, 3=Landless household 
Code  
3                 If yes; Has the household lost or gained land? 1=Lost, 2=Gained “  
4                 If yes; What was the reason? 1=Redistribution, 2=Land dispute, 
3=Inherited from husband’s family, 4=Inheritance from wife’s family, 5=Land 
taken due to migration, 6=Land taken for public purpose, 7=Land taken due to 
poor management, 8=Other, explain  
“  
5                 If yes; When was this?  Year (EC)  
6                 If yes; how much land was lost/received?  Tsimdi  
 
 
  2. Land Administration 
S.No. Questions Unit Answer 
1 1. Involvement in land certification program   
2 Are you or a member of your family a member of the land committee (LAC)? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
3 If yes, who is member? 1=Husband/household head, 2=Wife, 3=Female head 
of household, 4=Son, 5=Daughter, 6=Other 
  
4 Does your household have a land certificate? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
5   Has there been a change in the status of your land certificate in the period 
2006-2010 (EC1998-2002)?    1=Yes, 0=No 
 
Code 
 
6 If yes, when was this? Year (EC)  
7 If yes; what is the change? 1=Lost the certificate, 2=Received a new 
certificate, 3=Renewed the certificate and changed the name of owner, 4=The 
certificate was taken with the land, 5=Other, explain 
 
Code  
8    Whose name is on the certificate? 1=Current household head, 2=Father of 
current household head, 3=Husband of current household head, 
4=Grandfather of current household head, 5=Mother of current household 
head, 6=Grandmother of current household head, 7=Other, specify 
Code  
9   If you lose your certificate, how much would you be willing to pay for a 
replacement?  Maximum willingness to pay 
Birr  
10   If you don’t have a certificate, would you want to get a certificate? 1=Yes, 
0=No  
Code  
11 If yes, how much would you maximum be willing to pay for it?  Birr  
12 Does having a certificate protect you against encroachment on your land by 
your neighbors?  1=Less risk of encroachment, 0=No difference  
Code  
13 Is there a need for a new land demarcation to make borders clearer?  1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
14 Do you have sufficient witnesses that can confirm the borders of your plots in 
case somebody contest them?   1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
15 Would you prefer to receive a new land certificate with a map of each of your 
plots, with clear identification of the location and size and shape of the plot?    
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
16    If yes, how much is your maximum willingness to pay for such a certificate? Birr  
17    If yes, how many mandays are you maximum willing to work outside the 
busiest agricultural season for the tabia to obtain such a certificate? 
Mandays  
18 Would you prefer to receive a new certificate with names and pictures of 
husband and wife (joint certificate)? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=I have no spouse 
Code  
19    If yes, how much would you maximum be willing to pay for such a 
certificate? 
 
Birr  
20   If no, why not?  1=The certificate I have is good enough, 2=The new 
certificate will not give more protection, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
21 Do you think a joint certificate will give women more influence in decision-
making related to land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code 
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22 Has the land registration and certification had any effect on the amount of 
inheritance disputes in your community? 1=More inheritance disputes, 2=No 
change, 3=Less inheritance disputes 
Code  
23  If change in inheritance disputes, has this affected your household? 1=Yes, 
0=No. 
Code  
24 Do you feel that having a certificate will increase the possibility of obtaining 
compensation in case the land is taken? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Not sure 
Code  
25 Do you believe that having a land certificate improves the tenure security of 
women? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Not sure 
Code  
26 How do you believe that having land certificate will affect the number of 
conflicts related to inheriting land to children? 1=Less disputes, 2=No 
difference, 3=More disputes, 4=Not sure 
Code  
27 If your land were suddenly demanded for public purposes by the tabia, how 
much compensation, minimum, would you consider to be a fair compensation 
for loosing your land? 
Birr/ all 
land on 
farm 
 
28 If it became legal to sell land, would you consider to sell the land if you got a 
good price? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Only if I came in a desperate situation, 
Code  
29 If you were allowed to sell your land and are willing to sell it, how much would 
be the minimum acceptable price for you to sell it now? Price without value of 
your house and other buildings on your land. 
Birr/ all 
land on 
farm 
 
30 Do you think land sales should be accepted in some cases? 1=Never, 2=Only 
in urban areas, 3=Only in urban and peri-urban areas, 4=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
33 Are you interested in planting trees on any of your plots? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
34 If yes, why? 1=Profitable to plant trees, 2=Trees provide firewood and building 
materials, 3=Trees are like a savings account (buffer stock), 4=Other, specify: 
Code 
More 
than one 
ok 
 
35 If no, why not? 1= Not profitable to plant trees, 2=Takes too long before they 
can be harvested, 3=They compete with crops, 4=Illegal to plant trees on 
cropland, 5=Uncertain whether she/he will get the benefits from the trees, 
6=Other, specify: 
Code  
36 Does having the land certificate increase your incentive to plant trees? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
37 Are there restrictions on tree planting in your community? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
38   If yes, what type of restrictions? 1=Not allowed to plant trees on land suitable 
for food crop production, 2=Not allowed to plant eucalyptus trees, 
3=Eucalyptus trees are only allowed to be planted on homestead plots, 
4=Other, specify: 
 
Code 
More 
than one 
possible 
 
39 Would you have planted more eucalyptus trees if there were no restrictions on 
where they could be planted? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
40    If yes, where would you plant more eucalyptus trees? 1=On homestead plot, 
2=On poor quality cropland, 3=On good quality cropland, 4=On communal 
land if it were divided to individuals, 5=Other, specify: 
 
Code 
More 
than one 
possible 
 
41    If yes, why? 1=Eucalyptus is profitable, good market, 2=Need it for 
construction purposes, 3=Need it for fuelwood, 4=Other, specify: 
 
 
Code  
42 Are there programs that encourage tree planting in the community? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
 
Code  
43 If yes, what trees do they encourage planting of? 1=Eucalyptus, 
2=Agroforestry trees, 3=Indigenous trees, 4=Other, specify: 
 
Code 
More 
than one 
possible 
 
44 If yes, on what types of land is tree planting encouraged? 1=Steep slopes, 
2=Degraded lands, 3=Homestead plots, 4=Other, explain: 
Code 
More 
than one 
possible 
 
45 Is the Land Administration Committee (LAC) active in your kushet and tabia? Code  
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1=Yes, 0=No 
46 If yes, has the work of the committee affected your household and land 
management in any way? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
47 If yes, how has your household been affected?  Indicate for the possible 
effects below: 
 
  
48 Participated in information meetings, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
49 Improved knowledge about land management, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
50 Has improved land management, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
51 Has lost land due to land taking by the LAC, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
52 Has become more tenure secure, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
53 Have reduced land renting activity due to fear of loss of land, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
54 Has reduced migration activity due to fear of loss of land, 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
55 Has improved conservation of the land due to fear of losing the land 
otherwise,  1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
56 Has started to report land renting/sharecropping to the LAC/Tabia, 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
57 Other effects, specify: 
 
Code  
58 Are you satisfied with the way the LAC does its job? 1=Satisfied, 0=Not 
satisfied, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
59 If not satisfied, explain why: 1= Does not do the job it should do, 2=Treat 
some people in an unfair way, 3=Are incompetent, 4=Do not know or follow 
the law, 5=Other, explain: 
 
Code  
60 If satisfied, explain why: 1=They are active and contribute to improved land 
management in the tabia, 2=They do not interfere in how people manage their 
land and that is good, 3=They help in sorting out land disputes, 4=Other, 
explain: 
 
Code  
61 Has the household received a warning or been penalized by the LAC for 
some reason? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
62 If yes, what was the reason for the warning/penalty/fine? 1=Poor land 
management,  2=Illegal land renting, 3=Migration and neglect of land, 
4=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
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Questions strictly for male respondents 
1. Disposition of land upon household break 
S.no Question Unit Answer 
1 Who will inherit the land registered on this household? 1=Oldest son/daughter, 
2=Oldest son, 3=Oldest daughter, 4=Youngest unmarried son/daughter, 
5=Unmarried son, 6=Unmarried daughter, 7=Favorite son, 8=Favorite 
daughter, 9=Other family members, 10=The village, 11=Joint management by 
children, 12=Other, specify: 
Code  
2 Have you been married before? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
3 If yes; What was the reason for the break? 1=Divorce, 2=Death of wife, 
3=Single due to migration of spouse 
Code  
4 If yes; Was the break during the last four years, 2006-2010 (EC1998-2002)? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
6  If divorce; How much land did you get/keep after divorce? 1=All, 2=More than 
half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=Land is jointly managed after 
divorce (Land was too small to be divided), 7=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
7 Does it matter how much land you brought into marriage, for how much you 
get in case of divorce? 1=It does not matter, equal share always, 2=Only land 
obtained during marriage is shared equally, 3=Inherited land is kept by the 
individual, other land is shared equally, 4=Other, specify 
 
Code  
8 Do you have a wife today? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 Questions asked if he has a wife today:     
9 In case of divorce today, how much of the land registered on this household 
would you get? 1=All, 2=More than half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 
6=Don’t know, 7=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
10 In case of divorce, who of the children are expected to stay with you? 1=All, 
2=None of them 3=Some of them, 4=Do not have children, 5=Don’t know  
Code  
11 In case of death of wife, how much land would you keep? 1=All, 2=More than 
half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=Don’t know, 7=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
12 In case of death of wife, how much land would be given to children? 1=All, 
2=More than half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=Don’t know, 
7=Other,  specify: 
Code  
 
 
Knowledge about the land law (strictly male respondents) 
S.No.  Unit Answer 
1 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use modern technology? -=Don’t know 
# years  
2 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use traditional technology? -=Don’t 
know 
# years  
3 Do the same restrictions apply to sharecropped out land as to rented out land 
(fixed cash rent)? 1=Yes, 2=No restriction on length of contract for 
sharecropping, 3=Other, specify:  
 
Code  
4 In case of divorce, what happens to the land? : 1=Has to be negotiated 
between those involved; 2=Shared equally between husband and wife; 
3=Other; 4=Don’t know. 
Number  
5 What is the minimum farm size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, 99=Don’t 
know 
Tsimdi  
6 What is the maximum farm size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, 99=Don’t 
know 
---  
7 How long-term must land rental contracts minimum be to have to be reported to 
the tabia and approved? 1=Three months, 2=One year, 3=Three years, 4=Ten 
years, 5=Do not have to report, 6=All have to be reported, 7=Don’t know, 
  
Years  
8 How large share of the farm holding can be rented out maximum? 1=One 
quarter, 2=Half, 3=Three quarter, 4=Depends on family needs for food, 5=All,  
Code  
9 Who is responsible for sustainable management of rented land? 1=The Code  
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certificate holder(landlord), 2=The tenant, 3=Joint responsibility, 4=Free to 
decide 
10 Is it legal for a household to mortgage the use right for its land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Don’t know 
Code  
11 The head of the household has left the tabia where the land is located for 10 
years (but the rest of the family stays on the land). Does it affect the use right 
of the family?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
12 Can your wife deny you to rent out your family land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know, 3=Other, specify:  
 
Code  
13 Does your 18 year old son have the right to deny you to rent out your land if he 
wants to farm on the land and is still living in your household? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Don’t know, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 A household has rented out all its land and has been away for 3 years but has 
no permanent job, can the land be expropriated and distributed to other 
households in the community? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
Questions to men only 
Perceptions and opinions on the land proclamation 
S.no Question Unit Answer 
1 Are you familiar with the new land proclamation for your region and its content? 
1=Yes, 2=Some of it, 0=No 
Code  
 Do you agree with the following rules?   
3    Only half of the farm holding should be allowed rented out?  1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Don’t know 
Code  
4    Legal support for land conflict resolution related to land renting should only be 
provided if contracts have been reported and registered at the tabia level? 
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
5    Equal sharing of land upon divorce?   1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
6    Land sales should be illegal?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
7    Land mortgaging should be illegal? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
8    Land should be taken from households that have been away for more than 2 
year even if they have no permanent job, 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
9    Females should be allowed to plough the land?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
10    Land should be taken from households that do not conserve their land well? 
1=Yes, 0=No,  2=Don’t know 
  
11 Does the new land proclamation affect how your household manages its land?   
1=Yes, 0=No,  2=Don’t know 
Code  
12    If yes, explain how:  1=Take better care of it, 2=Ask tenants to take better care 
of it, 3=Invest more on it, 4=Other, specify 
 
Code  
13    If no, why? 1=Follow traditional rules, 2=Managed the land well before also, 
3=Do not know what is in the proclamation, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 How would you perceive a change in the land law such that the wife also should 
have her name and picture on the certificate?  1=Indifferent (acceptable), 
2=Good, 3=Bad 
Code  
15 Would including the wife’s name on the certificate, affect her power over the 
land? 
1=Has no effect, 2=She has a stronger position in case of divorce or husband’s 
death, 3=She involves more in land-related decisions within marriage (e.g. crop 
choice and input use), 4=She controls more of the income from production on 
the land, 5=She is involved in land-renting decisions, 6=She does more work on 
the land, 7=Other, specify: 
Code 
Multiple 
codes 
allowed 
 
16 Do you agree that all land rental contracts should be written and reported to the 
tabia?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Only contracts longer than 3 years 
Code  
17    If yes, why? 1=Good to have registration of such transactions, 2=Will make 
the land rental market work better, 3=Help avoid exploitative contracts, 
4=Ensures that food needs of household is considered, 5=Strengthens 
bargaining power of landlords, 6=Reduces land disputes, 7=Other, specify: 
Code 
Multiple 
responses 
possible 
 
18    If no, why? 1=Unnecessary and costly, 2=No benefit, 3=Inconvenient, 
4=Increase tenure insecurity of poor people who fail to farm the land 
themselves, 5=People will not report anyway, contracts will go underground, 
6=Other, specify: 
Code  
19 Do you perceive sharecropping as land renting and to be subject to the same 
regulations as land renting? 1=Yes, 0=No, sharecropping is not land renting 
Code  
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20 Do you consider it legal for a household to sharecrop out all its land? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
21 Do you think that households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
22 Do you think that female-headed households, orphan households and other 
poor households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land when they 
lack resources to cultivate it themselves? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
23 If yes, why? 1=It secures their livelihood, 2=They cannot use the land efficiently 
themselves, 3=The land can be made available for more productive farmers, 
4=Other, specify 
Code 
Multiple 
codes 
allowed 
 
24 If no, why? 1=They should farm it themselves, 2=They should follow the law, 
3=They should give away the land to others if they fail to farm it, 4=Other, 
specify: 
Code  
25 Do you agree that farm holdings should not be further subdivided but be farmed 
jointly by family members? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
26 If yes, why? 1=Further fragmentation is bad for land use, 2=Cooperation is good 
for the families, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
27 If no, why? 1=Difficult to farm together, 2=Some are forced to leave, 3=It 
increases landlessness, 4=It is possible to subsist on smaller plots of land, 
5=Other, specify: 
Code  
28 Do you think there will be any new land redistributions in your tabia within the 
next ten years? 1=Yes, 0=No,  2=Don’t know 
Code  
29 Do you think that the landless in the community should be given more of the 
land through redistribution? 1=Yes, 0=No,  2=Don’t know 
Code  
30 Do you agree that land should be taken from households that have been out of 
the village for more than 2 years but do not have a permanent job? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
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Questions strictly for female respondents 
NB! Preferably to be asked by a female enumerator without the husband present 
1. Disposition of land upon household break 
S.no Question Unit Answer 
1 Who will inherit the land registered on this household? 1=Oldest son/daughter, 
2=Oldest son, 3=Oldest daughter, 4=Youngest unmarried son/daughter, 
5=Unmarried son, 6=Unmarried daughter, 7=Favorite son, 8=Favorite 
daughter, 9=Other family members, 10=The village, 11=Joint management by 
children, 12=Other, specify: 
Code  
2 Have you been married before? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
3 If yes; What was the reason for the break? 1=Divorce, 2=Widowed, 
3=Separated due to migration of husband 
Code  
4 If yes; Was the break during the last four years, 2006-2010 (EC1998-2002)? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
5   If yes, how many children did you have at the time of break? Number  
6   If yes, how many of the children accompanied you after the break? Code  
7   If yes; How much land did you get? 1=It does not matter, equal share always, 
2=Only land obtained during marriage is shared equally, 3=Inherited land is 
kept by the individual, other land is shared equally, 4=Other, specify 
 
Code  
8 Does it matter how much land you brought into marriage, for how much you 
get in case of divorce? 1=It does not matter, equal share always, 2=Only land 
obtained during marriage is shared equally, 3=Inherited land is kept by the 
individual, other land is shared equally, 4=Other, specify 
Code  
9 Do you have a husband now? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 Questions asked if she has a husband today:                                                             
10 In case of divorce today, do you expect to keep any of the land of this 
household? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
11 If yes; How much of the land of this household would you get?1=All, 2=More 
than half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=They cannot split the land 
but will continue to share it, 7=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
12 If yes; What would you do with your land? 1=Sharecrop it, 2=Crop it herself 
(with help of sons), 3=Rent it out for money, 4=Other, specify 
Code  
13 If sharecrop: Who would you sharecrop with? 1=Neighbor/other in the tabia, 
2=Ex husband, 3=Own kin, 4=In-laws, 5=Others 
Code  
14 In case of divorce, who of the children are expected to stay with you? 1=All, 
2=None of them 3=Some of them, 4=Do not have children, 5=Depends on the 
childrens’ choice, 6=Don’t know 
Code  
15 In case of divorce, would you stay in this village? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=don’t know Code  
16 In case of divorce, what would happen to the house? 1=Wife will get the 
house, 2=Husband will get it, 3=Husband and wife will share it, 4=Don’t know, 
5=Other 
Code  
17 In case of death of husband, how much land would you keep? 1=All, 2=More 
than half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=Don’t know, 7=Other, 
specify: 
Code  
18 In case of death of husband, how much land would be given to children? 1=All, 
2=More than half, 3=Half, 4=Less than half, 5=Nothing, 6=Don’t know, 
7=Other, specify; 
Code  
 
 
61 
 
 
2. Knowledge about the land law (strictly female respondents) 
S.N
o.  
Unit Answer
(s) 
1 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use modern technology? -=Don’t know, 999=no 
limit 
# years  
2 What is the maximum number of years for which households can lease/rent (or 
sharecrop) their land to others who will use traditional technology? -=Don’t know, 
999=no limit 
# years  
3 Do the same restrictions apply to sharecropped out land as to rented out land (fixed 
cash rent)? 1=Yes, 2=No restriction on length of contract for sharecropping, 3=Other, 
specify:  
 
Code  
4 In case of divorce, what happens to the land? : 1=Has to be negotiated between those 
involved; 2=Shared equally between husband and wife; 3=Other; 4=Don’t know. 
Numbe
r 
 
5 What is the minimum farm size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, 99=Don’t know Tsimdi  
6 What is the maximum farm size allowed? Size in tsimdi or 0=No limit, 99=Don’t know ---  
7 How long-term must land rental contracts minimum be to have to be reported to the 
tabia and approved? 1=Three months, 2=One year, 3=Three years, 4=Ten years, 5=Do 
not have to report, 6=All have to be reported, 7=Don’t know,  
Years  
8 How large share of the farm holding can be rented out maximum? 1=One quarter, 
2=Half, 3=Three quarter, 4=Depends on family needs for food, 5=All,  
Code  
9 Who is responsible for sustainable management of rented land? 1=The certificate 
holder(landlord), 2=The tenant, 3=Joint responsibility, 4=Free to decide 
Code  
10 Is it legal for a household to mortgage the use right for its land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
11 The head of the household has left the tabia where the land is located for 10 years (but 
the rest of the family stays on the land). Does it affect the use right of the family?  
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
12 Can you deny your husband to rent out your family land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know, 
3=Other, specify:  
Code  
13 Does your 18 year old son have the right to deny you to rent out your land if he wants 
to farm on the land and is still living in your household? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know, 
3=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 A household has rented out all its land and has been away for 3 years but has no 
permanent job, can the land be expropriated and distributed to other households in the 
community? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
15 Is there a Land Administration Committee in your tabia? 1.Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
16 If yes, did you participate in the election of the committee? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
17 
If yes to Q#15, is there a reservation for female members in the land administration 
committee? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
18 
If yes to Q#17, what is the minimum number of female members that has to be placed 
in the land administration committee? 
Numb
er 
 
19 
If yes to Q#15, are there female members in the current land committee of the tabia? 
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
20 If yes to Q#19, are you a member of the land admin. committee? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
 
3. Women’s decision-power (strictly female respondents) 
S.No.  Unit Answer 
1 Are you involved in the land investment and production decisions of any of the plots? 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
2 If yes, please copy the ID code of these plots.  (Multiple codes possible) Code  
3 If yes, who normally works on these plots? 1=Yourself only, 2=Jointly with 
husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband and other family 
members, 5=Other, specify; 
Code  
4 If yes, who are involved in the decisions? 1=Yourself only, 2=Jointly with 
husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband and other family 
members, 5=Other, specify; 
Code  
5 If yes, who mainly manages/controls the income from these plots? 1=Yourself only, 
2=Jointly with husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband 
alone, 5=Other, specify; 
Code  
6 Who mainly decides how the money you earned would be used? 1=Yourself only, 
2=Jointly with husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband 
Code  
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only, 5=Other, specify; 
7 Who mainly decides on the common resources of the household? 1=Yourself only, 
2=Jointly with husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband 
only, 5=Other, specify; 
Code  
8 Do you have any money or physical asset (e.g. livestock, trees) of your own that you 
alone can decide how to use? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
9 Have you yourself ever taken out or been given a loan either in cash or in kind to start 
or expand a business? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
10 Are you usually permitted to go to the market place on your own? 1=Yes: alone, 2=Yes: 
only if someone accompanies, 3=Not at all 
Code  
11 Who in your household usually has the final say on whether or not you should work to 
earn money from non-farm business/employment? 1=Yourself only, 2=Jointly with 
husband/partner, 3=Jointly with other household member, 4=husband only, 5=Other, 
specify; 
Code  
 
Questions to women only 
4. Perceptions and opinions on the land law (proclamation) 
S.no Question Unit Answer 
1 Are you familiar with the new land proclamation for your region and its content? 
1=Yes, 2=Some of it, 0=No 
Code  
 Do you agree with the following rules?   
2    Reporting of all land renting and sharecropping to tabia?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
3    Only half of the farm holding should be allowed rented out?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
4    Legal support for land conflict resolution related to land renting should only be 
provided if contracts have been reported and registered at the tabia level? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
5    Equal sharing of land upon divorce?   1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
6    Land sales should be illegal?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
7    Land mortgaging should be illegal? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
8    Land should be taken from households that have been away for more than 2 year 
even if they have no permanent job, 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
9    Females should be allowed to plough the land?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know Code  
10    Land should be taken from households that do not conserve their land well? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Don’t know 
  
11 Does the new land proclamation affect how your household manages its land?   1=Yes, 
0=No,  2=Don’t know 
Code  
12    If yes, explain how:  1=Take better care of it, 2=Ask tenants to take better care of it, 
3=Invest more on it, 4=Can take more responsibility for it, 5=Other, specify 
Code  
13    If no, why? 1=Follow traditional rules, 2=Managed the land well before also, 3=Do not 
know what is in the proclamation, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
14 How do you perceive the regulation that the wife also should have her name and 
picture on the certificate?  1=Indifferent (acceptable), 2=Good, 3=Bad 
Code  
15 Does the wife’s name on the certificate, affect her power over the land? 
1=Has no effect, 2=She has a stronger position in case of divorce or husband’s death, 
3=She involves more in land-related decisions within marriage (e.g. crop choice and 
input use), 4=She controls more of the income from production on the land, 5=She is 
involved in land-renting decisions, 6=She does more work on the land, 7=Other, 
specify: 
Code  
16 Do you agree that all land rental contracts should be written and reported to the tabia?  
1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Only contracts longer than 3 years 
Code  
17    If yes, why? 1=Good to have registration of such transactions, 2=Will make the land 
rental market work better, 3=Help avoid exploitative contracts, 4=Ensures that food 
needs of household is considered, 5=Strengthens bargaining power of landlords, 
6=Reduces land disputes, 7=Other, specify: 
Code 
Multiple 
responses 
possible 
 
18    If no, why? 1=Unnecessary and costly, 2=No benefit, 3=Inconvenient, 4=Increase 
tenure insecurity of poor people who fail to farm the land themselves, 5=Peole will not 
report anyway, contracts will go underground, 6=Other, specify: 
Code  
19 Do you perceive sharecropping as land renting and to be subject to the same 
regulations as land renting? 1=Yes, 0=No, sharecropping is not land renting 
Code  
20 Do you consider it legal for a household to sharecrop out all its land? 1=Yes, 0=No, 
2=Don’t know 
Code  
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21 Do you think that households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land? 1=Yes, 
0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
22 Do you think that female-headed households, orphan households and other poor 
households should be allowed to sharecrop out all their land when they lack resources 
to cultivate it themselves? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
23 If yes, why? 1=It secures their livelihood, 2=They cannot use the land efficienctly 
themselves, 3=The land can be made available for more productive farmers, 4=Other, 
specify 
Code  
24 If no, why? 1=They should farm it themselves, 2=They should follow the law, 3=They 
should give away the land to others if they fail to farm it, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
25 Do you agree that farm holdings should not be further subdivided but be farmed jointly 
by family members? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
26 If yes, why? 1=Further fragmentation is bad for land use, 2=Cooperation is good for the 
families, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
27 If no, why? 1=Difficult to farm together, 2=Some are forced to leave, 3=It increases 
landlessness, 4=It is possible to subsist on smaller plots of land, 5=Other, specify: 
Code  
28 Do you think there will be any new land redistributions in your tabia within the next ten 
years? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
29 Do you think that the landless in the community should be given more of the land 
through redistribution? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t know 
Code  
30 Do you agree that land should be taken from households that have been out of the 
village for more than 2 years but do not have a permanent job? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don’t 
know 
Code  
 
For all partners, landlords and tenants    
   
 
1 Which type of contract do you prefer?  1=Oral contracts among partners only, 2=Oral with 
witnesses, 3=Written contract, not reported, 4=Written and reported to tabia leaders,  
5=It depends on the type of partner, specify how: 
 
6=It depends on the type of contract, specify how: 
 
7=It depends on the duration of contract, specify how: 
 
Code 
Multipl
e codes 
possible 
 
2 If more than one type is preferred, explain when and why. 1=Long-term contracts prefered 
to be written. 2=Fixed-rent contract preferred to be written, 3=Sharecropping contracts 
preferred to be oral, 4=Prefer oral contracts with relatives, 5=Prefer written contracts with 
strangers, 6=Other, specify 
Code 
Multipl
e codes 
possible 
 
3 If registration of land rental contracts is needed to get legal support in case 
of dispute, will you report your rental contracts? 1=Yes, I will begin with 
that, 0=No, 2=Only if I do not trust my contract partner, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
4 Has land registration and certification had any impact on whether you participate in the 
land rental market (including sharecropping)?  Yes=1, No=0 
Code  
5         If yes, are you more or less willing to rent in or out your land after you received the 
certificate?  1=More willing/able, 2=No difference, 3=Less willing/able 
Code  
6         If yes, why are you more or less willing? 1=Feel more tenure secure, 2=Easier to rent 
in land, 3=More difficult to rent in land, 4=Other, specify: 
Code  
7 Has receiving a land certificate affected the type of land contract you prefer to use? 1=No, 
2=Yes, prefer fixed-rent more, 3=Prefer longer-term contract after I received certificate, 
4=Other, specify:                               99=I have no certificate    
Code  
8 Have you had any land disputes in relation to some of your land contracts?    
Yes=1, No=0 
Code  
9          If yes, what was/were the dispute(s) about? 1=Work effort of tenant, 2=Input use, 
3=Output sharing, 4=Contract length, 5=Other, specify: 
Code  
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10          If yes, how many disputes during the last four years? Number  
11          If yes, how was/were the dispute(s) resolved? 1=Negotiation between parties, 2=By 
help from elders, 3=Social court, 4=Tabia administration, 5=Woreda court, 6=Other, 
specify: 
Code  
12 Has the new land proclamation had any effect on whether you participate in the land rental 
market or not? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=I don‟t know anything about the new proclamation: go to 
question 19 
Code  
13    If yes, what is the difference? 1=Rent out more, 2=Rent out less, 3=Rent in more, 4=Rent 
in less 
Code  
14 Has the land proclamation had any effect on what plots of land you rent in or out? 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
15  If yes, how? 1=Rent in or out more poor quality land, 2=Rent in or out well-conserved 
land only, 3=Other, explain: 
Code  
16 Has the land proclamation had any effect on who is responsible for conservation of the 
rented in or out land? 1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
17    If yes, explain: 1=Tenant has taken over full responsibility for land conservation, 2=Need 
to renegotiate responsibility for land conservation, 3=Other, specify: 
 
Code  
18 If no, explain: 1=Tenant was already responsible for land conservation, 2=Landlord still 
has to take responsibility for land conservation, 3=Make agreement with the other party in 
each case about who is responsible for conservation, 4=Do not know what the proclamation 
says about this 
Code  
19 Do you prefer to have written sharecropping and rental contracts that are registered at the 
tabia/Land Administration Committee? 1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Only for contract partners that I 
do not know well, 3=Other, explain: 
 
Code  
 
 
Ask the following questions to TENANTS 
1 What type of land do you prefer to rent in – given current prices, 
sharing contracts and the land proclamation? 1=Good land, 2=Medium 
land, 3=Poor land 
Code  
2 Why do you rent in land? 1=Have surplus labor, 2=Have oxen, 3=Have 
small farm size myself, 4=Landless, 5=Other, specify 
Code  
3 As a tenant do you have many landlords to choose between? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
4       If yes, do you have a choice between alternative contracts? 1=Yes, 0=No Code  
5 Which land rental arrangement do you currently apply? 1=Sharecropping, 
2=Sharecropping with advance payment, 3=Fixed-rental contact, 4=Input/cost-
sharing contract: Landlord pays cash inputs, 5=Cost-sharing where landlord advance 
input costs, 6=Cost-sharing with equal sharing of cash inputs, 7=Cost-sharing where 
tenant advances input costs, 8=Other, specify: 
Code  
6 Which land rental arrangement do you prefer? 1=Sharecropping, 2=Sharecropping 
with advance payment, 3=Fixed-rental contact, 4=Input/cost-sharing contract: 
Landlord pay cash inputs, 5=Cost-sharing where landlord advance input costs, 
6=Cost-sharing with equal sharing of cash inputs, 7=Cost-sharing where tenant 
advances input costs, 8=Other, specify: 
Code  
7 What is the advantage of the type of contract you are preferring?  1=It reduces risk 
(risk sharing), 2=It enables me to share input costs, 3=It gives me incentive to 
produce more, 4=It is the only available contract type, 5=It gives me more food after 
harvest, 6=I do not have to pay cash in advance, 7=I can ensure optimal input use and 
yield on the land, 8=I can pay after harvest,9=Other:  
Code  
8 Do you have any renting/sharecropping contracts that are for more than 
one year?   Yes = 1       No =0 
Code  
9 Duration of contracts: 0=Less than a year, 1=1 year, 2=2 years, 3=3 years, 4=4 years. Contract 1     
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5=5 years, 6.>5 years, specify:          years, 99=Open-ended (continue till one party 
cancels the contract) 
Contract 2 
Contract 3 
 
10 Do you prefer contracts that last for more than one year?  Yes = 1      No = 0 Code  
11 If yes, why do you prefer longer-term contracts?  1=I can invest more in the land, 
2=I can apply more inputs, 3=I do not have to search for other partners so often, 
4=Other, specify: 
Code  
12 If no, why do you not prefer longer-term contracts?  1=Only need to rent for one 
year, 2=Do not know whether I want to rent another year, 3=Other, specify: 
Code  
13      If yes, what do you do to obtain longer-term contracts?  1=Work hard on rented 
land to get contract renewal, 2=Negotiate long-term contracts from the beginning, 
3=Select landlords that are willing to give long-term contracts, 4=Identify 
particularly poor landlords that have weak bargaining power, 5=Offer fixed up-front 
payment 
Code  
14 Would you like (be able) to rent in some more land?       Yes = 1       No = 0 Code  
15 If your answer is yes, How much more? Tsimdi  
16 Have you attempted to rent in the additional land you wanted over the last 2 
years? 1.Yes, 0.No 
Code  
17 How many potential landlords have you contacted in an attempt to lease in some 
land over the last two years? 
Number  
 
 
 
List them. 
Name Relationship Sex 
Distance to 
his/her 
house 
Partner 
lives 
Success of 
the attempt 
Year How much 
(Tsimdi)? 
1           
2           
3           
4         
5         
Sex: 1=Female, 0=Male, Relationship: 1=Blood-related, 2=In-law, 3=Neighbour, 4=Same ethnic group, 
5=Same religious group, 6=Other, specify: 
Distance: Minutes walk, Partner lives: 1=In same kushet, 2=In neighboring kushet in same tabia, 3=In 
different tabia. Success of attempt: 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
17 Has it become easier or more difficult to rent in land after the 
land registration and land certification in your community? 
1=Easier, 2=No change, 3=More difficult,  
Code  
18 Has it become easier or more difficult to get long-term rental 
contracts after the land registration and certification?  
1=Easier, 2=No change, 3=More difficult 
Code  
19 If you wanted to rent in some additional plots of land, have 
you had any potential landlords to choose among?   1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
20 If your answer is yes, how many potential landlords have contacted you 
over the last two years? 
Number  
21 How much time did you spend searching for partners during last year? Hours  
List them. 
Name Relationship Sex 
Distanc
e to 
his/her 
house 
Partner 
lives 
Success of 
the attempt 
Year How much 
(Tsimdi)? 
1           
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2           
3           
4         
5         
Sex: 1=Female, 0=Male, Relationship: 1=Blood-related, 2=In-law, 3=Neighbour, 4=Same ethnic group, 
5=Same religious group, 6=Other, specify: 
Distance: Minutes walk, Partner lives: 1=In same kushet, 2=In neighboring kushet in same tabia, 3=In 
different tabia. Success of attempt: 1=Yes, 0=No 
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For Landlords 
1 What type of land do you prefer to rent out – given current prices, 
sharing contracts and the new land proclamation? 1=Good land, 
2=Medium land, 3=Poor land 
Code  
2 Why do you rent out land? 1=Shortage of labour, 2=Shortage of 
oxen, 3=Personal problem (illness, aged, etc.), 4=Poor/no access 
to credit, 5=Seed/Fertilizer problem, 6=Off-farm job, 7=Other, 
Specify: 
Code  
3 What type of land contract do you prefer? 1=Sharecropping, 
2=Sharecropping with advance payment, 3=Fixed-rent contract, 
4=Input/costsharing contract, 5=Advance input costs yourself, 
6=Let tentant advance input costs, 7=Pay input costs yourself 
without refunding, 8=Other, specify: 
Code  
4 Why do you prefer this type of contract? 1=Share risk with tenant, 
2=It enables me to share input costs, 3=It provides me with cash, 
4=The only type of contract that I am offered, 5=It provides food 
after harvest (food security), 6=Other, specify: 
Code  
5 Do you think that the tenant shirks (deliberately avoid to work 
hard) in sharecropping? 0=No, 1=Yes, 2=Some tenants do, 3=If I 
do not monitor them, 4=If I do not use threat of eviction, 5=Other, 
specify: 
Code  
6 If yes, what mechanisms are you using to motivate the tenant to 
work hard? 1=Eviction when performance is poor, 2=Increase the 
share to the tenant, 3=Increase intensity of monitoring and 
supervision, 4=Provide inputs for production, 5=Nothing, 
6=Threat of eviction, 7=Other, specify  
Code  
7 What criteria do you use to select your tenant? 1=Trustworthy, 
2=Good reputation as farmer, 3=In-laws claim the tenancy, 
4=Blood-related relatives, 5=Good neighbors, 6=The one that 
offers better contract, 7=The first who comes and asks to rent in, 
8=Other, specify: 
Tsimdi  
 
8 
 How much land have you rented/sharecropped out? 
                                                                                           1=Last 
year 
                                                                                           2=Two 
years ago            
 
                                                                   
 
 
Tsimdi 
 
 
 
9 Has the household experienced any of these large changes in the 
situation over the last four years? 1=Change in non-land resources 
of household (e.g. oxen, labour), 2=Change in tenure security, 
3=Land registration and certification, 4=Change in access to 
partners, 5=Other, specify: 
Code  
10 Would you like (be able) to rent out some more land?   1=Yes, 
0=No 
  
11 If your answer is yes, How much more?  (check that it is not larger than the 
total operated farm size last year (own farm size – rented out land last year) 
Tsimdi  
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12 Which additional plot(s) would you rent out Plot.no.  
13 What type of land do you prefer to rent out? 1=Far away land, 
2=Poor quality land, 3=Good quality land to get better return, 
4=Respond to demand from potential tenants what plots they 
want, 5=Other, specify: 
  
14 Have you attempted to rent out the additional land you wanted to 
lease/rent/sharecrop out?   1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
15 How many potential tenants have you contacted in an attempt to 
lease/rent/ sharecrop out your land this year and last year? 
Number  
 
 
 
 
 
List them. 
Name Relationship Sex 
Distanc
e to 
his/her 
house 
Partner 
lives 
Success of 
the attempt 
Year How much 
(Tsimdi)? 
1           
2           
3           
4         
Sex: 1=Female, 0=Male, Relationship: 1=Blood-related, 2=In-law, 3=Neighbour, 4=Same ethnic group, 
5=Same religious group, 6=Other, specify: 
Distance: Minutes walk, Partner lives: 1=In same kushet, 2=In neighboring kushet in same tabia, 3=In 
different tabia. Success of attempt: 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
16 How much time did you spend last year to search for partners? Hours  
17 If you did not want to rent out more land, have you had many potential tenants to 
choose among?  1=Yes, 0=No 
Code  
18 If yes, how do you choose your tenants (criteria)? 1.Reputation, 2.Kinship, 3.Resource 
rich, 4.Social status, 5.Good farm skill, 6.Others, specify 
Code  
19 If your answer is yes, how many potential tenants have contacted you 
during the last two years? 
Number  
 
List them. 
Name Relationship Sex 
Distanc
e to 
his/her 
house 
Partner 
lives 
Success of 
the attempt 
Year How much 
(Tsimdi)? 
1           
2           
3           
4         
5         
Sex: 1=Female, 0=Male, Relationship: 1=Blood-related, 2=In-law, 3=Neighbour, 4=Same ethnic group, 
5=Same religious group, 6=Other, specify: 
Distance: Minutes walk, Partner lives: 1=In same kushet, 2=In neighboring kushet in same tabia, 3=In 
different tabia. Success of attempt: 1=Yes, 0=No 
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20 If you have a land certificate, does having the certificate give you any 
advantages in relation to your contracts with your tenants?  1=Yes, 
0=No 
Code  
21    If yes, how?    1=Improved bargaining power, 2=Contract fullfillment, 3=More 
tenure security, 4=More long-term contracts, 5=Better performance by tenant, 
6=Tenant takes more responsibility for land conservation, 7=Other, specify: 
Code  
22 Does having a certificate make you more willing to rent out the land 
to strangers? 1=Yes, 0=No 
  
23 If you do not have a land certificate, what are the disadvantages, if 
any, in relation to land renting out that you perceive? 1=No 
disadvantages, 2=Fear land grabbing by tenant, 3=More land disputes 
with tenant, 4=Harder to enforce tenant to work hard, 5=Less 
bargaining power in relation to contract choice, 6=Other, specify 
Code  
24 If you face such difficulties, how do you respond? 1=Rent out less 
land, 2=Use one-year contracts only (without contracts), 3=Use one-
year renewable contracts only, 4=Rent out to relatives only, 5=Rent 
out only to tenants that you trust, 6=Other, specify: 
Code  
25 Does the recent land proclamation affect whether you continue to 
rent out land or not?  1=Yes, 0=No, 2=Don‟t know the proclamation 
Code  
Pure owner operator 
1 Have you participated in the land rental market (including 
sharecropping) ever before? 1.Yes, 0.No 
Code  
2   If yes, have you rented in (sharecropped in) any plots during the last..  
                                                                                                 ten years,                          
                                                                                                 five years,              
Number 
of times 
 
 
 
3 Have you ever rented out (sharecropped out) any plot of land 
during the last. 
                                                                                 ten years,                          
                                                                                 five years                                                                                                          
Number 
of times 
 
 
 
4 If you participated before, why not any more? 1.Have enough 
land, 2.Lack oxen, 3.Lack labour, 4.Failed to find partner, 
5.Fear losing the land, 6. Not profitable enough, 7.Other, 
specify: 
Code  
5 Your actual own farm size is Tsimdi  
6 Given the land and nonland resources you currently have, and 
the going rental contract conditions in your village, would you 
like to participate in the land rental market?     1.Yes, Rent in, 
2.Yes, Rent out, 0.No 
Code  
7       If yes, Rent in: How much would you like to rent in? Tsimdi  
8       If yes, Rent out: How much would you like to rent out? Tsimdi  
9 Have you ever attempted but failed to participate in the land rental market 
before (including sharecropping)?   1.Yes, but failed to rent in, 2.Yes, but 
failed to rent out, 0.No 
Code 
 
 
10       If yes, when? Year  
11       If yes, how many did you contact? Number  
 
           List them. 
No. Name Sex Relationship Distance to his/her 
house 
1     
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2     
3     
4     
5     
Sex: 1=Female, 0=Male, Relationship: 1=Blood-related, 2=In-law, 3=Neighbour, 4=Same ethnic group, 
5=Same religious group, 6=Other, specify: 
Distance: Minutes walk, Partner lives: 1=In same kushet, 2=In neighboring kushet in same tabia, 3=In 
different tabia. Success of attempt: 1=Yes, 0=No 
 
12 How much time did you spend searching for partners if you 
tried?         
Hours/year  
13 If you have never rented-in or attempted to rent-out any of your 
plots, Why? 1. Have enough resource to cultivate it myself, 2. 
Fear of losing land to be redistributed, 3. Fear of shirking by 
partner, 4. Other, specify 
Code 
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The information collected will be 
Zone used for research purposes. It will
be treated as confidential and will
Woreda not be used by tax authorities or
others to assess the need for 
Tabia food aid or other assistance.
Household ID
Name of household head
Distance to woreda town (walking minutes)
Distance to local market (walking minutes)
Distance to primary school  (walking minutes)
Distance to secondary school  (walking minutes)
Distance to all weather road  (walking minutes)
Distance to transporatation service  (walking minutes)
Distance to health center  (walking minutes)
Distance to grain mill
Distance to nursery site
Distance to protected water source(walking minutes)
Distance to tap water(walking minutes)
Enumerators: Dates interviewed
First interview: 
Second interview:
Third interview:
Data checked by When Status Comments
ok Correct Return
Data punched When Who Comments
Pages
Pages
Pages
Pages
MASTERS PROGRAM: 2010 NOMA FELLOWS 
NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES
IN COLLABORATION WITH MEKELLE UNIVERSITY
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
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Farm household survey: Household characteristics Page 1
Woreda: Interviewer: Household number:
Tabia Date of interview:
Kushet Household head name:
Household composition in 2002 (E.C.)
Household members Religion:
MNo: Name relationship Sex Age Education Skills Occupation Presence
1 Head
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Codes: Relation to household head: 1=wife, 2=child, 3=grand child, 4=brother, 5=sister, 6=hired labour
7=other, specify:
Sex: 1=female, 2=male. Age: Years.  Skills: specify
Education: 0=illeterate, 1=read and write, 2= elementary, 3= church education, 4= secondary, 5=other, specify.
Occupation: 0=dependent, 1= student (in school), 2=watch after animals, 3=housewife, 4= farming
5=hired labourer, 6=off-farm activity, 7=Tabia/kushet official: specify, 8=other: specify. PA/village official:specify
Presence: Months staying in the household during last 12 months
Do any of the household members live outside the village this year (EC 1995)? Yes No
Name Place Purpose Since when Coming back when
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HOUSEHOLD NAME:________________________________HH id:_______________
Farm household survey: Livestock Production Activities
Animal type Stock Stock Stock Born duringDied duringSlaughteredBought Sold during
2 years ago1 year agoCurrent EC 2001/02EC 2001/02EC 2001/02 EC 2001/02EC 2001/02
Cattle
Milking cow
Other cows
Oxen
Heifer
Bulls
Calves
Sheep
Goats
Horses
Mules
Donkeys
Camel
Chicken
Bee hives
Source of cash to buy the livestock
1 Sale of output Other
2 Remittance
3 Credit
4 Sale of food from FFW
5 Sale of other livestock
 
 
